P JazzMan

White Sexual Slavery by US Occupation Forces and u.s security companiesالاتجار بعراقيات من أجل الجنس ـ

2011-11-13T11:01:00.003+02:00

The Sex Trafficking of the Iraqi women and child abuses by US Occupation Forces and U.S Security Companies did not stop till now . Many women have been taken hostages tortured, and sexually abused.**

"The Transatlantic Slave Trade lasted formally in the U.S. from 1619-1865. Over 8 million Africans died during the Middle Passage, which is the transport voyage from Africa to the Americas. Over 20 million Africans died over all. This does not include the Africans who fought against slavery, the millions who have died because of European and American colonization, or the several million that lived through slavery or died during slavery".***

الاتجار بعراقيات من أجل الجنس

عنّ تقرير "كرامتنا" الذي أعدته حركة "التغيير الاجتماعي للتعليم في الشرق الأوسط"، وهي منظمة غير حكومية مقرها لندن، إن
الضحايا يتم نقلهن إلى دول مثل سوريا، والأردن ولبنان، ودولة الإمارات والسعودية، لغاية الاستغلال الجنسي.

و أن ظاهرة الاتجار بالنساء تظل خافية نظراً لعدة أسباب مجتمعة، منها الفساد ومحظورات دينية وثقافية ولا مبالاة وعدم استعداد السلطات للتصدي لها.

وتناول التقرير معاناة الضحايا، وبعضهن تتراوح أعمارهن ما بين عشرة إلى 12 عاماً، فالضحايا بداخل العراق ينتهي بهن المطاف للعمل بنواد ليلية أو بيوت دعارة "أسست، في المقام الأول، لملاقاة الطلب المتزايد من قبل الجنود الأمريكيين."

وتقدر "منظمة حرية المرأة في العراق" اختفاء قرابة 4 آلاف عراقية، خُمسهن تقل أعمارهن دون سن 18 عاماً، خلال السنوات السبعة التي أعقبت الغزو الأمريكي، الذي أدى لنزوح وتهجير مئات الآلاف من العراقيين.
ولا يقتصر الاتجار بالفتيات على العصابات الإجرامية فحسب، بل إن العائلات أصبحت متورطة في تلك الظاهرة بشكل كبير عن طريق بيع الفتيات وإجبارهن على الزواج، من أجل التغلب على الصعوبات الاقتصادية ولحل النزاعات وسداد الديون.

من بين النماذج التي ساقها التقرير، حالة "أميرة"، 17 عاماً، والتي وافق والدها على عرض رجل للعناية بزوجته المعاقة، مقابل 200 دولار شهريًا، فبجانب القيام بالأعمال المنزلية، أُجبرت على ممارسة الجنس مع الأبن وأصدقائه.

ومن الحالات الأخرى التي استشهد بها التقرير، "شذى" التي تخلى عنها والدها قرب الحدود السورية، وجرى تهريبها إلى العاصمة دمشق حيث تعرضت للاغتصاب من قبل خمسة رجال وبيعت لاحقاً لامرأة أجبرتها للعمل كعاملة جنس بناد ليلي.

سكرتارية الـحـرّيـة,
Secrétaire exécutif-ve,
• (مـُـنــَـظــّـمــة الـحـرّيـة)
Un organisation à but non-lucratif.
منظمة نون-بروفيت

..........................................................
** (P Jazzman comment: & for more .. please read this study:
Study title: Iraqi Women Under Occupation.
Produced by: Ghali Hassan
Published by: Brussels Tribunal Dossier.
For Download: Click Here

*** http://www.engagediversity.net/exploitation.html

بيان : احتجاج وإدانة ضد عملية عسكرية تركية في إقليم كردستان العراق

2011-08-25T11:34:00.001+03:00

http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=272402

بيان : احتجاج وإدانة ضد عملية عسكرية تركية في إقليم كردستان العراق

منذ يوم الأربعاء الماضي المصادف 17/8/2011 والطيران الحربي التركي يقوم بطلعات جوية وقصف طيرانه العسكري لمناطق عراقية في محافظة السليمانية في إقليم كردستان العراق بذريعة مشابهة للذرائع الزائفة التي تقدمها الحكومة الإيرانية في قصفها للمناطق الحدودية العراقية, بذريعة وجود ومطاردة وقتل أنصار حزب العمال الكردستاني. وظهر يوم أمس الأحد المصادف 21/8/2011 تجاوزت الطائرات الحربية التركية الأجواء العراقية الدولية من جديد وشنت غارة عدوانية على سيارة مدنية يستقلها مدنيون كانت تسير على طريق مدينة رانية التابعة لمحافظ السليمانية فدمرت السيارة وقتلت من فيها, وهم سبعة أفراد من عائلتين كرديتين (ثلاثة أطفال وامرأتان ورجلان). ولم يكن بينهم أي شخص كردي من إقليم كردستان تركيا, إذ أن القتلى الشهداء السبعة هم من أبناء وبنات شعب إقليم كردستان العراق.
إن الأمانة العامة للتجمع العربي لنصرة القضية الكردية إذ تحتج بشدة وتدين بحزم الجريمة الجديدة التي ارتكبتها القوات التركية على الأراضي العراقية وضد مواطنين ومواطنات من العراق باعتباره تجاوزاً فظاً على السيادة الوطنية العراقية وجريمة قتل لسبعة من مواطنات ومواطني العراق, ينبغي أن يدان من قبل الحكومة العراقية وحكومة إقليم كردستان والمجتمع الدولي والرأي العام العالمي, تطالب في الوقت نفسه بوقف الأعمال العدوانية ضد الشعب الكردي في كردستان العراق فوراً والاعتذار للشعب العراقي بكل قومياته واتخاذ كافة الإجراءات الضرورية الكفيلة بردع العدوان من جانب الأمم المتحدة ومجلس الأمن الدولي ومنع تكراره.
كما تقدم الأمانة العامة أحر تعازيها ومواساتها لذوي الشهداء وللشعب الكردي.
الخزي والعار للقتلة والذكر الطيب لشهداء العراق الأبرار.
الأمانة العامة
التجمع العربي لنصرة القضية الكردية
22/8/2011

Thomas Sankara توماس سانكارا

2011-06-20T23:28:00.001+03:00

Former President of Burkina Faso . الرئيس السابق لبوركينا فاسو الأفريقية
He was assassinated in 1987 during a coup d'etat.أغتيل عام 1987 who was known as a revolutionary Marxist Leninist ثورياً كان ماركسياً لينينياً

As Africa looks desperately for leaders of integrity and vision, the life and ideals of the late Thomas Sankara seem more and more relevant and exemplary with the passage of time. This new film should go a long way towards explaining why, though largely forgotten in this country, Sankara is still venerated on his own continent as the ‘African Che,’ a legendary martyr like Patrice Lumumba or Amilcar Cabral. The film recovers for the present a detailed history of Sankara’s brief four-year rule and his revolutionary program for African self-reliance as a defiant alternative to the neo-liberal development strategies imposed on Africa by the West, both then and today. Sankara, a charismatic army captain, came to power in Burkina Faso, in 1983, in a popularly supported coup. He immediately launched the most ambitious program for social and economic change ever attempted on the African continent. To symbolize this rebirth, he even renamed his country from the French colonial Upper Volta to Burkina Faso, ‘Land of Upright Men.’ As soon as he took office, he reduced the salaries of all public servants, including his own, and forbade the use of chauffeur-driven Mercedes and 1st class airline tickets. Like many revolutionary leaders, he banned unions, a free press, anything which might stand in the way of his plans for the immediate and radical transformation of society. He was one of the first to recognize that key to the development of Burkina Faso and Africa was improving the status of women. He was the first African leader to appoint women to major cabinet positions and to recruit them actively for the military. He outlawed forced marriages and encouraged women to work outside the home and stay in school even if pregnant. He launched a nation-wide public health campaign vaccinating over 2 ½ million people in a week, a world record. He was also one of the first African environmentalists, planting over 10 million trees to retain soil and halt the growing desertification of the Sahel. He promoted local cotton production and even required public servants to wear a traditional tunic, woven from Burkinabe cotton and sewn by Burkinabe craftsmen. He redistributed land from the feudal landlords and gave it directly to the peasants. Wheat production rose in just three years from 1700 kg per hectare to 3800 kg per hectare, making the country food self-sufficient. He started an ambitious road and rail building program to tie the nation together, eschewing any foreign aid by relying on his country’s greatest resource, the energy and commitment of its own people.Sankara’s experiment attracted intense interest far beyond Burkina Faso, posing a serious threat to the status quo, especially to France’s continued dominance of its former West African colonies and to the corrupt regimes ruling these client states. Sankara spoke eloquently and unflinching in forums like the Organization of African Unity against continued neo-colonialist penetration of Africa through Western trade and finance. He opposed foreign aid, saying that ‘he who feeds you, controls you.’ Decades before talk of cancellation of Africa’s debt became acceptable in world banking circles, Sankara called for a united front of African nations to repudiate their foreign debt. He argued that the poor and exploited did not have an obligation to repay money to the rich and exploiting. While celebrating Sankara’s achievements, this film does not ignore his tragic flaws. By 1986 Sankara’s rapid, sometimes authoritarian changes had begun to alienate larger sectors of the Burkinabe population, leaving him more isolated, even from elements in his own ruling circle. Like revolutionaries as far back as the French Revolution, Sankara was so committed to achieving his ideals, he was unwilling to give them enough time to ripen in his people. As one close friend observes, ‘Sankara was an impatient man,’ driven by the desperation of his people. As opposition mounted, Sankara attempted to repress it. He established Peoples Revolutionary Tribunals in towns and workplaces around the country where people were tried without counsel for being corrupt officials, counter-revolutionaries or just lazy workers, based not on credible evidence just private grudges. He also encouraged the formation of Revolutionary Defense Committees, gangs of armed youth who terrorized ordinary citizens. When the nation’s school teachers went on strike, Sankara dismissed all of them, leaving the education system, his country’s greatest hope for progress, a shambles. By the beginning of 1987, Sankara’s position had become more precarious. He was warned to take action but fatalistically refused on the grounds that he needed to remain true to the ideals of his revolution. He noted prophetically that Che Guevara had been executed when he was 39 as well. Clandestinely, elements in the Burkinabe leadership forged relationships with Côte d’Ivoire president Félix Houphoet-Boigny, France’s staunchest ally and an outspoken opponent of Sankara’s increasingly influential attacks on neo-colonialism. On October 15th during a staff meeting, a gang of armed military, either led or ordered by Blaise Compaoré, Sankara’s closest friend and most trusted comrade throughout the revolution, assassinated him. His body was dismembered, buried in a make-shift grave and any mention of him was erased from public view. Twenty years later, Blaise Compaoré remains dictator of Burkina Faso; he has become immensely wealthy and is France’s most reliable proxy in the region. During the current, almost unopposed wave of globalization, Sankara’s brief revolution offers an alternative or at least the possibility of another route for African development based on autonomy and local self-reliance. Despite his excesses, Sankara’s unimpeachable personal integrity, his clear, innovative ideas and tireless dedication to his people set a standard for the leadership Africa deserves and craves. This film is the perfect vehicle for passing on Sankara’s legacy, both as one of the most exceptional figures in the history of African liberation and a true visionary for Africa’s future. the text is from http://newsreel.org

Lenin’s Choice: Interpretation vs. Formalization - Slavoj Zizek

2011-06-17T01:42:00.003+03:00

The first public reaction to the idea of reactualizing Lenin is, of course, an outburst of sarcastic laughter: Marx is OK, even on Wall Street, there are people who love him today – Marx the poet of commodities, who provided perfect descriptions of the capitalist dynamics, Marx of the Cultural Studies, who portrayed the alienation and reification of our daily lives -, but Lenin, no, you can’t be serious! The working class movement, revolutionary Party, and similar zombie-concepts? Doesn’t Lenin stand precisely for the FAILURE to put Marxism into practice, for the big catastrophe which left its mark on the entire XXth century world politics, for the Real Socialist experiment which culminated in an economically inefficient dictatorship? So, in the contemporary academic politics, the idea to deal with Lenin is accompanied by two qualifications: yes, why not, we live in a liberal democracy, there is freedom of thought… however, one should treat Lenin in an “objective critical and scientific way,” not in an attitude of nostalgic idolatry, and, furthermore, from the perspective firmly rooted in the democratic political order, within the horizon of human rights – therein resides the lesson painfully learned through the experience of the XXth century totalitarianisms.

What are we to say to this? Again, the problem resides in the implicit qualifications which can be easily discerned by the “concrete analysis of the concrete situation,” as Lenin himself would have put it. “Fidelity to the democratic consensus” means the acceptance of the present liberal-parlamentary consensus, which precludes any serious questioning of how this liberal-democratic order is complicit in the phenomena it officially condemns, and, of course, any serious attempt to imagine a society whose socio-political order would be different. In short, it means: say and write whatever you want – on condition that what you do does not effectively question or disturb the predominant political consensus. So everything is allowed, solicited even, as a critical topic: the prospects of a global ecological catastrophe, violations of human rights, sexism, homophobia, antifeminism, the growing violence not only in the far-away countries, but also in our megalopolises, the gap between the First and the Third World, between the rich and the poor, the shattering impact of the digitalization of our daily lives… there is nothing easier today than to get international, state or corporate funds for a multidisciplinary research into how to fight the new forms of ethnic, religious or sexist violence. The problem is that all this occurs against the background of a fundamentalDenkverbot, the prohibition to think. Today’s liberal-democratic hegemony is sustained by a kind of unwritten Denkverbot similar to the infamousBerufsverbot in Germany of the late 60s – the moment one shows a minimal sign of engaging in political projects that aim to seriously challenge the existing order, the answer is immediately: “Benevolent as it is, this will necessarily end in a new Gulag!” The ideological function of the constant reference to the holocaust, gulag and the more recent Third World catastrophes is thus to serve as the support of this Denkverbot by constantly reminding us how things may have been much worse: “Just look around and see for yourself what will happen if we follow your radical notions!” And it is exactly the same thing that the demand for “scientific objectivity” means: the moment one seriously questions the existing liberal consensus, one is accused of abandoning scientific objectivity for the outdated ideological positions. This is the point on which one cannot and should not concede: today, the actual freedom of thought means the freedom to question the predominant liberal-democratic “post-ideological” consensus – or it means nothing.

Habermas designated the present era as that of the neue Undurchsichtlichkeit – the new opacity. [1] More than ever, our daily experience is mystifying: modernization generates new obscurantisms, the reduction of freedom is presented to us as the arrival of new freedoms. In these circumstances, one should be especially careful not to confuse the ruling ideology with ideology which SEEMS to dominate. More then ever, one should bear in mind Walter Benjamin’s reminder that it is not enough to ask how a certain theory (or art) declares itself to stay with regard to social struggles – one should also ask how it effectively functions IN these very struggles. In sex, the effectively hegemonic attitude is not patriarchal repression, but free promiscuity; in art, provocations in the style of the notorious “Sensation” exhibitions ARE the norm, the example of the art fully integrated into the establishment.

One is therefore tempted to turn around Marx’s thesis 11: the first task today is precisely NOT to succumb to the temptation to act, to directly intervene and change things (which inevitably ends in a cul de sac of debilitating impossibility: “what can one do against the global capital?”), but to question the hegemonic ideological coordinates. If, today, one follows a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space – it will be an act WITHIN the hegemonic ideological coordinates: those who “really want to do something to help people” get involved in (undoubtedly honorable) exploits like Medecins sans frontiere, Greenpeace, feminist and anti-racist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated, but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly enter the economic territory (say, denouncing and boycotting companies which do not respect ecological conditions or which use child labor) – they are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit. This kind of activity provides the perfect example of interpassivity: [2] of doing things not to achieve something, but to PREVENT from something really happening, really changing. All the frenetic humanitarian, politically correct, etc., activity fits the formula of “Let’s go on changing something all the time so that, globally, things will remain the same!”

Let us take two predominant topics of today’s American radical academia: postcolonial and queer (gay) studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, “postcolonial studies” tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities’ “right to narrate” their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress “otherness,” so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of the postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance towards the Other, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance towards the “Stranger in Ourselves,” in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves – the politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas… The true corruption of the American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included – up to a point), but conceptual: notions of the “European” critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of the Cultural Studies chic.

My personal experience is that practically all of the “radical” academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with the secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play on the stock market). If there is a thing they are genuinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environment of the “symbolic classes” in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism, Third World sweatshops, etc., is thus ultimately a defense against their own innermost identification, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: “Let’s talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make it sure that nothing will really change!” Symptomatic is here the journal October: when you ask one of the editors to what the title refers, they will half-confidentially signal that it is, of course, THAT October – in this way, one can indulge in the jargonistic analyses of the modern art, with the hidden assurance that one is somehow retaining the link with the radical revolutionary past… With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture towards the Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game in a straight way, and are honest in their acceptance of the global capitalist coordinates, in contrast to the pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt towards the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obliges no one to anything determinate.

It is true that, today, it is the radical populist Right which is usually breaking the (still) predominant liberal-democratic consensus, gradually rendering acceptable the hitherto excluded topics (the partial justification of Fascism, the need to constrain abstract citizenship on behalf of ethnic identity, etc.). However, the hegemonic liberal democracy is using this fact to blackmail the Left radicals: “we shouldn’t play with fire: against the new Rightist onslaught, one should more than ever insist on the democratic consensus – any criticism of it willingly or unwillingly helps the new Right!” This is the key line of separation: one should reject this blackmail, taking the risk of disturbing the liberal consensus, up to questioning the very notion of democracy.

So how are we to respond to the eternal dilemma of the radical Left: should one strategical support center-Left figures like Bill Clinton against the conservatives, or should one adopt the stance of “it doesn’t matter, we shouldn’t get involved in these fights – in a way, it is even better if the Right is directly in power, since, in this way, it will be easier for the people to see the truth of the situation”? The answer is the variation of old Stalin’s answer to the question “Which deviation is worse, the Rightist or the Leftist one?”: THEY ARE BOTH WORSE. What one should do is to adopt the stance of the proper dialectical paradox: in principle, of course, one should be indifferent towards the struggle between the liberal and conservative pole of today’s official politics – however, one can only afford to be indifferent if the liberal option is in power. Otherwise, the price to be paid may appear much too high – recall the catastrophic consequences of the decision of the German Communist Party in the early 30s NOT to focus on the struggle against the Nazis, with the justification that the Nazi dictatorship is the last desperate stage of the capitalist domination, which will open eyes to the working class, shattering their belief in the “bourgeois” democratic institutions. Along these lines, Claude Lefort himself, whom no one can accuse of communist sympathies, recently made a crucial point in his answer to Francois Furet: today’s liberal consensus is the result of 150 years of the Leftist workers’ struggle and pressure upon the State, it incorporated demands which were 100 or even less years ago dismissed by liberals as horror. [3] As a proof, one should just look at the list of the demands at the end of The Communist Manifesto: apart from 2 or 3 of them (which, of course, are the key one), all others are today part of the consensus (at least the disintegrating Welfare State one): the universal vote, the right to free education, universal healthcare and care for the retired, limitation of child labor…

Interpretation versus Formalization

So where are we to begin? In the present climate of the New Age obscurantism, it may appear attractive to reassert the lesson of Lenin’sMaterialism and Empiriocriticism: in today’s popular reading of quantum physics, as in Lenin’s times, the doxa is that science itself finally overcame materialism – matter is supposed to “disappear,” to dissolve in the immaterial waves of energy fields. [4] It is also true (as Lucio Colletti emphasized), that Lenin’s distinction between the philosophical and the scientific notion of matter, according to which, since the philosophical notion of matter as reality existing independently of mind precludes any intervention of philosophy into sciences, the very notion of “dialectics in/of nature” is thoroughly undermined. However… the “however” concerns the fact that, in Materialism and Empiriocriticism, there is NO PLACE FOR DIALECTICS, FOR HEGEL. What are Lenin’s basic theses? The rejection to reduce knowledge to phenomenalist or pragmatic instrumentalism (i.e., the assertion that, in scientific knowledge, we get to know the way things exist independently of our minds – the infamous “theory of reflection”), coupled with the insistence of the precarious nature of our knowledge (which is always limited, relative, and “reflects” external reality only in the infinite process of approximation). Does this not sound familiar? Is this, in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of analytical philosophy, not the basic position of Karl Popper, the archetypal anti-Hegelian? In his short article “Lenin and Popper,” [5] Colletti recalls how, in a private letter from 1970, first published in Die Zeit, Popper effectively wrote: “Lenin’s book on empiriocriticism is, in my opinion, truly excellent.” [6]

This hard materialist core of Empiriocriticism persists in the Philosophical Note-Books from 1915, in spite of Lenin’s rediscovery of Hegel – why? In his Note-Books, Lenin is struggling with the same problem as Adorno in his “negative dialectics”: how to combine Hegel’s legacy of the critique of every immediacy, of the subjective mediation of all given objectivity, with the minimum of materialism that Adorno calls the “predominance of the objective” (this is the reason why Lenin still clings to the “theory of reflection” according to which the human thought mirrors objective reality). [7] However, both Adorno and Lenin take here the wrong path: the way to assert materialism is not by way of clinging to the minimum of objective reality OUTSIDE the thought’s subjective mediation, but by insisting on the absolute INHERENCE of the external obstacle which prevents thought from attaining full identity with itself. The moment we concede on this point and externalize the obstacle, we regress to the pseudo-problematic of the thought asymptotically approaching the ever-elusive “objective reality,” never being able to grasp it in it infinite complexity. [8] The problem with Lenin’s “theory of reflection” resides in its implicit idealism: its very compulsive insistence on the independent existence of the material reality outside consciousness is to be read as a symptomatic displacement, destined to conceal the key fact that the consciousness itself is implicitly posited as EXTERNAL to the reality it “reflects.” The very metaphor of the infinite approaching to the way things really are, to the objective truth, betrays this idealism: what this metaphor leaves out of consideration is the fact that the partiality (distortion) of the “subjective reflection” occurs precisely because the subject is INCLUDED in the process it reflects – only a consciousness observing the universe from without would see the whole of reality “the way it really is.” [9]

This, of course, in no way entails that the tracing of the difference between idealism and materialism is today not more crucial than ever: one should only proceed in a truly Leninist way, discerning – through the “concrete analysis of concrete circumstances” – WHERE this line of separation runs. One is thus tempted to claim that, even WITHIN the field of religion, the singular point of the emergence of materialism is signalled by Christ’s words on the cross “Father, why have you forsaken me?” – in this moment of total abandonment, the subject experiences and fully assumes the inexistence of the big Other. More generally, the line of division is that between the “idealist” Socratic-Gnostic tradition claiming that the truth is within us, just to be (re)discovered through an inner journey, and the Judeo-Christian “materialist” notion that truth can only emerge from an EXTERNAL traumatic encounter which shatters the subject’s balance. “Truth” requires an effort in which we have to fight our “spontaneous” tendency.

And what if we were to connect this notion of the truth emerging from an external encounter with the (in)famous Lenin’s notion, from What Is to Be Done?, of how the working class cannot achieve its adequate class consciousness “spontaneously,” through its own “organic” development, i.e. of how this truth has to be introduced into it from outside (by the Party intellectuals)? In quoting Kautsky at this place, Lenin makes a significant change in his paraphrase: while Kautsky speaks of how the non-working-class intellectuals, who are OUTSIDE THE CLASS STRUGGLE, should introduce SCIENCE (providing objective knowledge of history) to the working class, Lenin speaks of CONSCIOUSNESS which should be introduced from outside by intellectuals who are outside the ECONOMIC struggle, NOT outside the class struggle! Here is the passage from Kautsky which Lenin quotes approvingly – [10]

“/…/ socialism and class struggle arise side by side and not one out of the other; each arises under different conditions. /…/ The vehicle of science is not the proletariat, but the bourgeois intelligentsia /…/ Thus, socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without and not something that arose within it spontaneously.”

- and here is Lenin’s paraphrase of it: [11]

” /…/ all worship of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, all belittling of the role of ‘the conscious element,’ of the role of Social-Democracy, means, quite independently of whether he who belittles that role desires it or not, a strengthening of the influence of bourgeois ideology upon workers. /…/ the only choice is – either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course /…/ the spontaneous development of the working-class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology /…/ for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade-unionism.”

It may SOUND the same, but it’s NOT: in Kautsky, there is no space for politics proper, just the combination of the social (working class and its struggle, from which intellectuals are implicitly EXCLUDED) and the pure neutral classless, asubjective, knowledge of these intellectuals. In Lenin, on the contrary, “intellectuals” themselves are caught in the conflict of IDEOLOGIES (i.e. the ideological class struggle) which is unsurpassable. (It was already Marx who made this point, from his youth when he dreamt of the unity of German Idealist philosophy and the French revolutionary masses, to his insistence, in late years, that the leadership of the International should under no conditions be left to the English workers: although the most numerous and best organized, they – in contrast to German workers – lack theoretical stringency.)

The key question thus concerns the exact STATUS of this externality: is it simply the externality of an impartial “objective” scientist who, after studying history and establishing that, in the long run, the working class has a great future ahead, decides to join the winning side? So when Lenin says “The theory of Marx is all-powerful, because it is true,” everything depends on how we understand “truth” here: is it a neutral “objective knowledge,” or the truth of an engaged subject? Lenin’s wager – today, in our era of postmodern relativism, more actual than ever – is that universal truth and partisanship, the gesture of taking sides, are not only not mutually exclusive, but condition each other: in a concrete situation, its UNIVERSAL truth can only be articulated from a thoroughly PARTISAN position – truth is by definition one-sided. (This, of course, goes against the predominant doxa of compromise, of finding a middle path among the multitude of conflicting interests.) Why not, then, shamelessly and courageously ENDORSE the boring standard reproach according to which, Marxism is a “secularized religion,” with Lenin as the Messiah, etc.? Yes, assuming the proletarian standpoint IS EXACTLY like making a leap of faith and assuming a full subjective engagement for its Cause; yes, the “truth” of Marxism is perceptible only to those who accomplish this leap, NOT to any neutral observers. What the EXTERNALITY means here is that this truth is nonetheless UNIVERSAL, not just the “point-of-view” of a particular historical subject: “external” intellectuals are needed because the working class cannot immediately perceive ITS OWN PLACE within the social totality which enables it to accomplish its “mission” – this insight has to be mediated through an external element.

And why not link these two externalities (that of the traumatic experience of the divine Real, and that of the Party) to the third one, that of the ANALYST in the psychoanalytic cure? In all three cases, we are dealing with the same impossibility which bears witness to a materialist obstacle: it is not possible for the believer to “discover God in himself,” through self-immersion, by spontaneously realizing its own Self – God must intervene from outside, disturbing our balance; it is not possible for the working class to actualize spontaneously its historical mission – the Party must intervene from outside, shaking it out of its self-indulgent spontaneity; it is not possible for the patient/analyst to analyze himself – in contrast to the Gnostic self-immersion, in psychoanalysis, there is no self-analysis proper, analysis is only possible if a foreign kernel which gives body to the object-cause of the subject’s desire. Why, then, this impossibility? Precisely because neither of the three subjects (believer, proletarian, analyst) is a self-centered agent of self-mediation, but a decentered agent struggling with a foreign kernel. God, Analyst, Party – the three forms of the “subject supposed to know,” of the transferential object, which is why, in all three cases, one hears the claim “God/Analyst/ the Party is always right”; and, as it was clear already to Kierkegaard, the truth of this statement is always its negative – MAN is always wrong. This external element does not stand for objective knowledge, i.e. its externality is strictly INTERNAL: the need for the Party stems from the fact that the working class is never “fully itself.”

In his Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx already deploys something like the logic of hegemony: the emergence of a “universal class,” a particular class which imposes itself as universal, engendering global enthusiasm, standing for society AS SUCH against the ancien regime, anti-social crime AS SUCH (like bourgeoisie in the French revolution). After follows the disillusion so sarcastically described by Marx: the day after, the gap between universal and particular becomes visible again, capitalist vulgar profit as the actuality of universal freedom, etc. – For Marx, of course, the only universal class whose singularity (exclusion from society of property) guarantees its ACTUAL universality, is the proletariat. This is what Ernesto Laclau rejects in his logic of hegemony: for Laclau, the short-circuit between the Universal and the Particular is ALWAYS illusory, temporary, a kind of “transcendental paralogism.” [12] However, is Marx’s proletariat really the negative of positive full essential humanity, or “only” the gap of universality AS SUCH, irrecoverable in any positivity? [13] In Alain Badiou’s terms, proletariat is not another PARTICULAR class, but a SINGULARITY of the social structure, and AS SUCH the universal class, the non-class among the classes.

What is crucial here is the properly temporal-dialectical tension between the Universal and the Particular. When Marx says that, in Germany, because of the compromised pettiness of the bourgeoisie, it is too late for the partial bourgeois emancipation, and that, because of it, in Germany, the condition of every particular emancipation is the UNIVERSAL emancipation, one way to read this is to see in it the assertion of the universal “normal” paradigm and its exception: in the “normal” case, partial (false) bourgeois emancipation will be followed by the universal emancipation through the proletarian revolution, while in Germany, the “normal” order gets mixed up. There is, however, another, much more radical way to read it: the very German exception, the inability of its bourgeoisie to achieve partial emancipation, opens up the space for the possible UNIVERSAL emancipation. The dimension of universality thus emerges (only) where the “normal” order enchaining the succession of the particulars is perturbed. Because of this, there is no “normal” revolution, EACH revolutionary explosion is grounded in an exception, in a short-circuit of “too late” and “too early.” The French Revolution occurred because France was not able to follow the “normal” English path of capitalist development; the very “normal” English path resulted in the “unnatural” division of labor between the capitalists who hold socio-economic power and the aristocracy to which was left the political power.

One can also make the same point in the terms of the opposition between interpretation and formalization: [14] the external agent (Party, God, Analyst) is NOT the one who “understands us better than ourselves,” who can provide the true interpretation of what our acts and statements mean; it rather stands for the FORM of our activity. Say, Marx’s deployment of the commodity form in the Chapter 1 of Capital is NOT a “narrative,” a Vorstellung, but aDarstellung, the deployment of the inner structure of the universe of merchandises – the narrative is, on the contrary, the story of the “primitive accumulation,” the myth capitalism proposes about its own origins. (Along the same lines, Hegel’s Phenomenology – contrary to Rorty’s reading – does not propose a large narrative, but the FORM of subjectivity; as Hegel himself emphasizes in the Foreword, it focuses on the “formal aspect /das Formelle/.[15] This is how one should approach the absence of large all-encompassing narratives today – recall Fredric Jameson’s supple description of the deadlock of the dialogue between the Western New Left and the Eastern European dissidents, of the absence of any common language between them:[16]

“To put it briefly, the East wishes to talk in terms of power and oppression; the West in terms of culture and commodification. There are really no common denominators in this initial struggle for discursive rules, and what we end up with is the inevitable comedy of each side muttering irrelevant replies in its own favorite language.”

Jameson at the same time insists that Marxism still provides the universal meta-language enabling us to situate and relate all other partial narrativizations/interpretations – is he simply inconsistent? Are there two Jamesons: one, postmodern, the theorist of the irreducible multiplicity of the narratives, the other, the more traditional partisan of the Marxist universal hermeneutics? The only way to save Jameson from this predicament is to insist that Marxism is here not the all-encompassing interpretive horizon, but the matrix which enables us to account for (to generate) the multiplicity of narratives and/or interpretations. It is also here that one should introduce the key dialectical distinction between the FOUNDING figure of a movement and the later figure who FORMALIZED this movement: ultimately, it was Lenin who effectively “formalized” Marx by way of defining the Party as the political form of its historical intervention, in the same way that St. Paul “formalized” Christ and Lacan “formalized” Freud. [17]

This formalization is strictly correlative to focusing on the Real of an antagonism: “class struggle” is not the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding. That is to say, one should not confuse this properly dialectical notion of Form with the liberal-multiculturalist notion of Form as the neutral framework of the multitude of “narratives” – not only literature, but also politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, stories we are telling ourselves about ourselves, and the ultimate goal of ethics is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist, in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell his story. The properly dialectical notion of Form signals precisely the IMPOSSIBILITY of this liberal notion of Form: Form has nothing to do with “formalism,” with the idea of a neutral Form, independent of its contingent particular content; it rather stands for the traumatic kernel of the Real, for the antagonism, which “colors” the entire field in question. In this precise sense, class struggle is the Form of the Social: every social phenomenon is overdetermined by it, which means that it is not possible to remain neutral towards it.

Notes

[1] Juergen Habermas, Die Neue Unuebersichtlichkeit, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1985.

[2]. As to this notion, Chapter 3 of Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies, London: Verso Books 1997.

[3] Claude Lefort, La complication, Paris: Fayard 1999. back up

[4] For an Althusserian attempt to save Lenin’s Empiriocriticism, Dominique Lecourt, Une crise et ses enjeux, Paris: Maspero 1973.

[5] First published in 1990, then reprinted in Colletti, Fine della filosofia, Roma: Ideazione 1996.

[6] When, in a typical transferential pathos, Lenin repeats again and again how Marx and Engels always called their philosophy “dialectical materialism,” it is easy for an anti-Leninist Marxologue to draw attention to the fact that Marx and Engels NOT EVEN ONCE used this term (it was Georgi Plekhanov who introduced it). This situation presented a nice deadlock to the Soviet editors of the collected works of Marx and Engels: in the Index, there HAD to be the entry “dialectical materialism,” which they then filled in with references to the pages where Marx or Engels speak of dialectics, of the materialist concept of history… However, this is not the whole story: there is a truth-effect in this hallucinatory projection of a later concept back into Marx. back up

[7] I owe this parallel to Eustache Kouvelakis, Paris (private conversation).

[8] For a more detailed critique of Adorno’s “predominance of the objective,” Chapter 2 of Slavoj Zizek, On Belief, London: Routledge 2001.

[9] In a passage of his Note-Books, Lenin comes to the edge of this insight when he notes how the very “abstraction” of thought, its “failure” to immediately grasp the object in its infinite complexity, its distance from the object, its stepping-back from it, brings us CLOSER to the “notion” of what the object effectively is: the very “one-sided” reduction the object to some of its abstract properties in the concept, this apparent “limitation” of our knowledge (sustaining the dream of a total intuitive knowledge) IS the very essence of knowledge… He comes to the edge of all this, and then again regresses to the predominant evolutionary notion of the infinite approaching to reality.

[10] Quoted from V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, New York: International Publishers 1999, p. 40.

[11] Lenin, op.cit., p. 40-41.

[12] See Ernesto Laclau, “The Politics of Rhetoric,” intervention at the conference Culture and Materiality, University of California, Davis, 23-25 April 1998. When today’s postmodern political philosophers emphasize the paradox of democracy, how democracy is possible only against the background of its impossibility, do they not reproduce the paradoxes of the Kantian practical reason discerned long ago by Hegel?

[13] See Eustache Kouvelakis’s commentary to L’Introduction a la Critique de la philosophie du droit de Hegel, Paris: Ellipses 2000.

[14] I owe this distinction to Alain Badiou (private conversation).

[15] This should be the answer to Veit Harlan, the Nazi director who, around 1950, despaired about the fact that Jews in the US did not show any understanding for his defense for making The Jew Suess, claimed that no American Jew can really understand what was his situation in the Nazi Germany: far from justifying him, this obscene (factual) truth is the ultimate lie. – At a different level, there are in Palestine today two opposite narratives (the Jewish and the Palestinian one) with absolutely no common horizon, no “synthesis” in a larger meta-narrative; the solution thus cannot be found in any all-encompassing narrative.

[16] Quoted from Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, Cambridge (Ma): MIT Press 2000, p. 237.

[17] This difference between interpretation and formalization is also crucial to introduce some (theoretical) order into the recent debates on the holocaust: although it is true that the holocaust cannot be adequately interpreted or narrated, in short: rendered meaningful, that all the attempts to do it fail and have to end in silence, it can and should be “formalized,” situated in its structural conditions of possibility.

Art: This is not a time for dreaming, Pierre Huyghe, 2004.

ديفيد جيلمور-David Gilmour

2011-05-31T02:14:00.005+03:00

مواليد كامبريدج، مارس-1946، كان ابوه محاضراً في علم الحيوان، أمه كانت معلّمة ومحررة أفلام، شارك في انتاج العديد من موسيقى الأفلام الانكليزية القديمة، ذات المعاني النوعيّة، تنقّل بين العديد من دول اوروبا وغيرها، ينشئ الفرق تارة، وتارةً يغني، وتارةً يعزف، لكنه مليئ ٌ بالإنتاج الموسيقي الذي لا مثيلَ لهُ. بحسّه الموسيقيّ العجيب. كان ديفيد جيلمور يمضي السنين الطوال وهو يؤلّف الموسيقى. قبل أن يخرج بإنتاجه الموسيقي للناس.

بين الروك الغاضب.. والصولو والبلوز والجاز.. والكلاسيك.. عاش فيها جميعها. لكنه ألف في فنّه الخاص. يكادُ يضاهي حس بيتهوفن ، يسبِقُ جسدهُ/لسانهُ وعيهُ بمؤلّفاته لأنها انعكاسٌ طبيعي لكل بيته الداخلية والخارجية. ما كلماته بشيئ محسَّن ولا متَكَلََّفة

أعماله بالمئات .. أعمالٌ نوعيّة متقنة

يتقن عدداً كبيراً من الآلات

ديفيد جيلمور.. فنّان وكاتب كلمات للأغاني.. وموسيقي وموزّع ومغني ..

مضى من عمره نحو65 سنة

ويستمرّ جيلمور في إنتاجاته

,
,

Dear Comrade Zizek

2011-05-11T19:52:00.000+03:00

Dear Comrade Zizek
We are ahead together here .. struggling to create the barbarian modernity

Dear comrade Slavoj Zizek ..our great Marxist Hegelian fighter
.. We ,here in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, struggling and have the radical consciousness to sweep away the dirty capitalism and to create a more justice in our reality.

Note: for those who want the books of the Rebel Hegelian fighter philosopher Slavoj Zizek .. I have found it .. In several languages . in the hope that we gonna translate Arabic copies soon.
To request books and articles contact me here: i_friendly_out@hotmail.com

رفيقي العزيز سلافوي شيشيك، نحن متقدِّمون معاً ههُنــــا.. إلى الحداثة البربريّة
رفيقي العزيز سلافوي شيشيك .. كم كنتَ رفيقاً مناضلاً ولا تزالُ يا رفيقي
رفيقي المناضل .. نحن قادرون على تكنيس الرأسمالية من تشوّهها المستفحل وخلق بيئة أكثر اتزاناً مع قوانين الطبيعة التاريخية

ملحوظة: لمن يريد مؤلّفات الفيلسوف الهيغلي المقاتل الثائر سلافوي شيشيك .. فإنها موجودة لدي .. بعدة لغات دون العربية، على أمل أن نقوم بترجمة نسخ عربية قريباً
لطلب الكتب والمقالات راسلوني:
i_friendly_out@hotmail.com

more about comrade Zizek: from wike...

Žižek" and "Zizek" redirect here. For the biographical documentary film, see Zizek!.

Slavoj Žižek
Žižek in 2008
Full name	Slavoj Žižek
Born	21 March 1949 (age 62) Ljubljana, SR Slovenia, SFR Yugoslavia
Era	20th- / 21st-century philosophy
Region	Western Philosophy Psychoanalysis
School	Hegelianism · Psychoanalysis ·Marxism
Main interests	Ontology · Film theory ·Psychoanalysis · Ideology ·Theology · Marxism
Notable ideas	Overidentification
Influenced by[show]
Influenced[show]

Slavoj Žižek (pronounced [ˈslavoj ˈʒiʒɛk]; born 21 March 1949) is a Slovenian continental philosopher and critical theorist working in the traditions ofHegelianism, Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. He has made contributions to political theory, film theory, and theoretical psychoanalysis.

Žižek is a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and a professor at the European Graduate School.^[1] He has been a visiting professor at, among others, the University of Chicago, Columbia University, London Consortium, Princeton, New York University, The New School, the University of Minnesota, the University of California, Irvine and the University of Michigan. He is currently the International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities at Birkbeck, University of London and president of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis, Ljubljana.^[2]

Žižek uses examples from popular culture to explain the theory of Jacques Lacan and uses Lacanian psychoanalysis, Hegelian philosophy and Marxist economic criticism to interpret and speak extensively on immediately current social phenomena, including the current ongoing global financial crisis. In a 2008 interview with Amy Goodman on the New York City radio show Democracy Now! he described himself as a "communist in a qualified sense," and in another appearance on the show in October 2009 he described himself as a "radical leftist".^[3]^[4] Žižek is widely acknowledged as one of the foremost intellectuals of the radical left.

He writes on many topics including subjectivity, ideology, capitalism, fundamentalism, racism, tolerance, multiculturalism, human rights, ecology,globalization, the Iraq War, revolution, utopianism, totalitarianism, postmodernism, pop culture, opera, cinema, political theology, and religion.

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Žižek was born in Ljubljana, Socialist Republic of Slovenia, SFR Yugoslavia to a middle-class family. His father Jože Žižek was an economist and civil servant from the region of Prekmurje in eastern Slovenia, his mother Vesna, native of the Brda region in the Slovenian Littoral, was an accountant in a state enterprise.^[5]^[6] He spent most of his childhood in the coastal town of Portorož.^[7] The family moved back to Ljubljana when Slavoj was a teenager. His parents were both atheists.^[6] Žižek attended the prestigious Bežigrad High School.^[7] In 1967, he enrolled at the University of Ljubljana, where he studied philosophy and sociology. He received a Doctor of Arts in Philosophy from the University of Ljubljana and studied psychoanalysis at the University of Paris VIII with Jacques-Alain Miller and François Regnault.

Žižek's early career was hampered by the political environment of 1970s Yugoslavia. He started his studies in an era of relative liberalization of the Communist regime. Among his early influences was the Slovenian Marxist philosopher Božidar Debenjak who introduced the thought of the Frankfurt School to Slovenia.^[8] Debenjak taught the philosophy of German idealism at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ljubljana, and his reading of Marx's Das Kapital from the perspective of Hegel'sPhenomenology of the Mind influenced many future Slovenian philosophers, including Žižek.^[9]

Žižek frequented the circles of dissident intellectuals, including the Heideggerian philosophers Tine Hribar and Ivo Urbančič,^[6] and published articles in alternative magazines, such as Praxis, Tribuna and Problemi, of which he was also an editor.^[7] In 1971, he was given employment at the University of Ljubljana as an assistant researcher with the promise of tenure. In 1973, after Josip Broz Tito and Stane Dolanc removed the reformist Slovenian leadership and the regime's policies toughened again, he was dismissed after his Master's thesis was explicitly accused of being "non-Marxist".^[10] He spent the next few years undertaking national service in theYugoslav army in Karlovac.

After four years of unemployment, Žižek gained a job as a recording clerk at the Slovenian Marxist Center. At the same time, he became involved with a group of Slovene scholars, among whom were Mladen Dolar and Rastko Močnik, whose theoretical focus was on the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan.^[11] In 1979, he was hired as a researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the University of Ljubljana with the help of philosopher Ivan Urbančič.^[10] In the early 1980s, he published his first books, focusing on the interpretation of Hegelian and Marxist philosophy from the perspective of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. He became one of the foremost members of the so-called Ljubljana school of psychoanalysis. Within its editorial and institutional framework, Žižek edited numerous translations of works by Lacan, Sigmund Freud and Althusser to Slovene. He also wrote the introduction to Slovene translations of G. K. Chesterton's and John Le Carre's detective novels. In 1988, he published his first book dedicated entirely to film theory.

In the late 1980s, he came to public attention as a columnist for the alternative youth magazine Mladina, which assumed a critical stance towards the Titoist regime, criticizing several aspects of Yugoslav politics, especially the militarization of society. Žižek was member of the Communist Party of Slovenia until October 1988, when he quit in protest against the JBTZ-trial together with 32 other Slovenian public intellectuals.^[12] Between 1988 and 1990, he was actively involved in several political and civil society movements which fought for the democratization of Slovenia, most notably theCommittee for the Defence of Human Rights.^[13] In the first free elections in 1990, he ran as candidate for Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia (an auxiliary institution abolished in the constitution of 1991) for the Liberal Democratic Party. In a 2008 interview with Amy Goodman on Democracy Now!, he described himself as a "communist in a qualified sense," and in another appearance in October 2009 he described himself as a "radical leftist".^[3]^[4]

It was not until the 1989 publication of his first book written in English, The Sublime Object of Ideology, that Žižek achieved international recognition as a social theorist. Since then, he has continued to develop his status as a confrontational intellectual. One of Žižek's most-widely discussed books, The Ticklish Subject (1999), explicitly positions itself against Deconstructionists, Heideggerians,Habermasians, cognitive scientists, and what Žižek describes as New Age "obscurantists".

Ian Parker claims that there is no "Žižekian" system of philosophy because Žižek, with all his inconsistencies, is trying to make us think much harder about what we are willing to believe and accept from a single writer (Parker, 2004). Indeed, Žižek himself defends Jacques Lacan for constantly updating his theories, arguing that it is not the task of the philosopher to act as the Big Other who tells us about the world but rather to challenge our own ideological presuppositions. The philosopher, for Žižek, is more someone engaged in critique than someone who tries to answer questions.^[14]

However, this claim about the role of the philosopher/theorist is complicated by how Žižek frequently derides the consumerist fashionability of postmodern cultural criticism while affirming his universal emancipatory stance and love for "grand explanations" (Žižek, 2008). In contrast to Parker, Adrian Johnston's book Zizek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity argues against the position that Žižek's thought has no consistency or underlying project. Specifically, Johnston claims in his Preface that beneath "what could be called 'the cultural studies Žižek'" is a singular "philosophical trajectory that runs like a continuous, bisecting diagonal line through the entire span of his writing (i.e. the retroactive Lacanian reconstruction of the chain Kant-Schelling-Hegel)." Žižek's affirmation of this claim suggests that like his predecessor Hegel, Žižek's work is better described as rigorous in the sense of systematic rather than as comprising a single, all-encompassing "system."

Žižek wrote text to accompany Bruce Weber photos in a catalog for Abercrombie & Fitch. Questioned as to the seemliness of a major intellectual writing ad copy, Žižek told the Boston Globe: "If I were asked to choose between doing things like this to earn money and becoming fully employed as an American academic, kissing ass to get a tenured post, I would with pleasure choose writing for such journals!"^[15] He is widely regarded^{[by whom?]} as a fiery and colorful lecturer who does not shy away from controversial remarks. His three-part documentary The Pervert's Guide to Cinema was broadcast on British television by the More4 channel in July 2006 and is available on DVD. Žižek has been publishing on a regular basis in journals such as Lacanian Ink and In These Times in the United States, the New Left Review and The London Review of Books in the United Kingdom, and with the Slovenian left liberal magazine Mladina and newspapers Dnevnik and Delo. He co-operates also with the influential Polish leftist magazine Krytyka Polityczna, regional South-East European left-wing journal Novi Plamen, and serves on the editorial board of the psychoanalytical journalProblemi.^{[citation needed]}

He is a fluent speaker of Slovene, Serbo-Croatian, English, French and German. He also has basic knowledge of Italian.^[16] He was formerly married to Slovenian philosopher Renata Salecl and toArgentine model Analia Hounie.^[17]

Astra Taylor's 2005 documentary Žižek! documented its title subject, and Žižek also appeared in her 2008 Examined Life. The International Journal of Žižek Studies was launched in 2007, and since 2005, Žižek has been an associate member of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts.^[18]

He is a returning professor at New York University where he has taught alongside the deconstructionist Avital Ronell in the place of the late Jacques Derrida during the fall semester.^[19]

[edit]Thought

[edit]Ontology

Žižek appropriates various ontologies as critical tools for his investigations. In doing so, Zizek does not posit his own ontology, rather he refigures discordant disciplines through their application to a topic of relevant interest and their differential relationship to one another. This radical approach results in a critique of such uses as misinterpretations. While Zizek posits a return to the category of theCartesian subject, a return to The German Ideology, and a return to Lacan, he does so in a way that undercuts their foundations and re-energizes their potential.

The defense of the category of the subject involves first a vindication of the notion of subjectivity for an adequate descriptive political theory. Žižek argues that hegemonic regimes function byinterpellating individuals into social roles and mandates within a given polity: we cannot understand how power functions without some account of the psychology of political subjects. Secondly, there is the vindication of the "category of the subject". Following Lacan, Žižek contends that subjectivity corresponds to a lack (manque) that always resists full inscription into the mandates prescribed to individuals by hegemonic regimes.
In his deployment of the category of "ideology", Žižek finds the notions of ideology in Karl Marx "The German Ideology"—which center on the notion of "false consciousness"—to be irrelevant in a period of unprecedented subjective reflexivity and cynicism as to the motives and workings of those in authority (see The Sublime Object of Ideology). It can be argued however that Žižek's most original aspect comes from its insistence that a Lacanian model of the barred or split subject, because of its stipulation that individuals' deepest motives are unconscious, can be used to demonstrate that ideology has less become irrelevant today than revealed its deeper truth (see Matthew Sharpe, Slavoj Žižek.)
In a contentious extension of the referential scope of ideology, Žižek maintains that dominant ideologies wholly structure the subject's senses of reality. Yet, The Real is not equivalent to the reality experienced by the subjects as a meaningfully ordered totality. To him, the Real names points within the ontological fabric knitted by the hegemonic systems of representation and reproduction that nevertheless resist full inscription into its terms, and which may as such attempt to generate sites of active political resistance.

In The Parallax View (2006), Žižek stages confrontations between idealist and materialist understandings of various aspects of ontology. One such confrontation between idealism and materialism is expressed in Lacanian terms between an idealism's purported ability to theorize the All versus a Materialism's understanding that an apparent All is really a non-All. His penchant for staging a confrontation between idealism and materialism leads him to describe his work in such paradoxical terms as a "materialist theology." Žižek offers that reality is fundamentally open and a materialist "minimal difference"—the gap that appears in reality between a reductionist description of physical process and one's experience of existence—is the real of human life and the crucial domain that an ontology must attempt to theorize. Žižek equates the gap with the Freudian death drive, as the negative and mortifying "thing that thinks." Although biological psychology might one day be able to completely model a person's brain, there would still be something left over that could not be explained. This "remainder" formally corresponds precisely to the Freudian death drive and Schellingian/Hegelian self-reflecting negativity or "Night of the World," all of which Žižek formulates as the zero-level of subjectivity. It is death drive which takes this role, not the limit-function to pleasure called the pleasure principle, thus it is the negative aspect of consciousness that breaks and offers judgment on the unrepresentable totality. Žižek points to the fact that consciousness is opaque. Taking his cue from Descartes' problem of the possible automaton in hat & coat and the Husserlian failure to fully account for the selfhood of the other (through resort to the metaphor of "empathy"), Žižek claims a primary characteristic of consciousness is that one cannot ever know if an apparently conscious being is truly conscious or merely an effective mime.

Žižek's metaphysics are, to a certain extent an anti-metaphysics, because he believes it is absurd to theorize the All, because something will always remain untheorized. This can be explained in Lacanian terms, in terms of the relationship between the Symbolic and the Real. For Žižek, we can view a person in several ways, but these ways are mutually exclusive. For example, we can see a person as either an ethical being with free will or a determined biological creature but not both. These are the Symbolic interpretations of the Real, ways of using language to understand that which is non-All, that which cannot be totally understood by description. For Žižek, however, the Real is not a thing which is understood in different ways depending on how you decide to look at it (person as ethical being versus person as biological being); the Real is instead the movement from one vantage point to another—the "parallax view". Žižek sidesteps relativism by claiming that there is a diagonal ontological cut across apparently incommensurable discourses, which points to their intersubjectivity. This means that although there are multiple Symbolic interpretations of the Real, they are not all relatively "true." Žižek identifies two instances of the Real; the abject Real, which cannot be symbolized, and the symbolic Real (see On Belief), a set of signifiers that can never be properly integrated into the horizon of sense of a subject. The truth is revealed in the process of transiting the contradictions; or the real is a "minimal difference", the gap between the infinite judgement of a reductionist materialism and experience as lived.

[edit]The formation of the subject

Žižek argues that Descartes' cogito is the basis of the subject. However, whereas most thinkers read the cogito as a substantial, transparent and fully self-conscious "I" which is in complete command of its destiny, Žižek proposes that the cogito is an empty space, what is left when the rest of the world is expelled from itself. The Symbolic Order is what substitutes for the loss of the immediacy of the world and it is where the void of the subject is filled in by the process of subjectivization. The latter is where the subject is given an identity and where that identity is altered by the Self.

Once the Lacanian concepts of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real are grasped, Žižek, in philosophical writings such as his discussion of Schelling, always interprets the work of other philosophers in terms of those concepts. This is so because "the core of my entire work is the endeavour to use Lacan as a privileged intellectual tool to reactualize German idealism". (See The Žižek Reader) The reason Žižek thinks German idealism (the work of Hegel, Kant, Fichte and Schelling) needs reactualizing is that we are thought to understand it in one way, whereas the truth of it is something else. The term "reactualizing" refers to the fact that there are different possible ways to interpret German idealism, and Žižek wishes to make "actual" one of those possibilities in distinction to the way it is currently realized. At its most basic, German idealism believes that the truth of something could be found in itself. For Žižek, the fundamental insight of German idealism is that the truth of something is always outside it^{[citation needed]}. So the truth of our experience lies outside ourselves, in the Symbolic and the Real, rather than being buried deep within us. We cannot look into our selves and find out who we truly are, because who we truly are is always elsewhere.

Our selves are somewhere else in the Symbolic formations which always precede us and in the Real which we have to disavow if we are to enter the Symbolic order.

To Žižek, Lacan's proposition that self-identity is impossible becomes central in structuration of the subject. The identity of something, its singularity or "oneness", is always split. There is always too much of something, an indivisible remainder, or a bit left-over which means that it cannot be self-identical (e.g., the meaning of a word can never be found in the word itself, but rather in other words; its meaning therefore is not self-identical). This principle of the impossibility of self-identity is what informs Žižek's reading of the German idealists. In reading Schelling, for example, the Beginning is not actually the beginning at all—the truth of the Beginning lies elsewhere, it is split or not identical to itself.

How, precisely, does the Word discharge the tension of the rotary motion, how does it mediate the antagonism between the contractive and the expansive force? The Word is a contraction in the guise of its very opposite of an expansion—that is, in pronouncing a word, the subject contracts his being outside himself; he "coagulates" the core of his being in an external sign. In the (verbal) sign, I—as it were—find myself outside myself, I posit my unity outside myself, in a signifier which represents me ("The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters").

The subject of enunciation is the "I" who speaks, the individual doing the speaking; the subject of the enunciated is the "I" of the sentence. "I" is not identical to itself—it is split between the individual "I" (the subject of enunciation) and the grammatical "I" (the subject of the enunciated). Although we may experience them as unified, this is merely an Imaginary illusion, for the pronoun "I" is actually a substitute for the "I" of the subject. It does not account for me in my full specificity; it is, rather, a general term I share with everyone else. In order to do so, my empirical reality must be annihilated or, as Lacan avers, "the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing". The subject can only enter language by negating the Real, murdering or substituting the blood-and-sinew reality of self for the concept of self expressed in words. For Lacan and Žižek, every word is a gravestone, marking the absence or corpse of the thing it represents and standing in for it. It is partly in the light of this that Lacan is able to refashion Descartes' maxim "I think, therefore I am" as "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I think not".

The "I think" here is the subject of the enunciated (the Symbolic subject) whereas the "I am" is the subject of the enunciation (the Real subject). What Lacan aims to disclose by rewriting the Cartesian cogito in this way is that the subject is irrevocably split, torn asunder by language

The concept of vanishing mediator is one that Žižek has consistently employed since For They Know Not What They Do. A vanishing mediator is a concept which somehow negotiates and settles—hence mediating—the transition between two opposed concepts and thereafter disappears. Žižek draws attention to the fact that a vanishing mediator is produced by an asymmetry of content and form. As with Marx's analysis of revolution, form lags behind content, in the sense that content changes within the parameters of an existing form, until the logic of that content works its way out of the latter and throws off its husk, revealing a new form in its stead. "The passage from feudalism to Protestantism is not of the same nature as the passage from Protestantism to bourgeois everyday life with its privatized religion. The first passage concerns "content" (under the guise of preserving the religious form or even its strengthening, the crucial shift—the assertion of the ascetic acquisitive stance in economic activity as the domain of manifestation of Grace—takes place), whereas the second passage is a purely formal act, a change of form (as soon as Protestantism is realized as the ascetic acquisitive stance, it can fall off as form)" (For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor).

Žižek sees in this process evidence of Hegel's "negation of the negation", the third moment of the dialectic. The first negation is the mutation of the content within and in the name of the old form. The second negation is the obsolescence of the form itself. In this way, something becomes the opposite of itself, paradoxically, by seeming to strengthen itself. In the case of Protestantism, the universalization of religious attitudes ultimately led to its being sidelined as a matter of private contemplation. Which is to say that Protestantism, as a negation of feudalism, was itself negated by capitalism.

[edit]The Real

The Real is not only opposed to the imaginary but is also located beyond the symbolic.

Unlike the latter, which is constituted in terms of oppositions such as "presence" and "absence," there is no absence in the real. The symbolic opposition between "presence" and "absence" implies the possibility that something may be missing from the symbolic, the real is "always in its place: it carries it glued to its heel, ignorant of what might exile it from there." If the symbolic is a set of differentiated signifiers, the real is in itself undifferentiated: "it is without fissure." The symbolic introduces "a cut in the real," in the process of signification: "it is the world of words that creates the world of things." Thus the real emerges as that which is outside language: "it is that which resists symbolization absolutely." The real is impossible because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic order. This character of impossibility and resistance to symbolization lends the real its traumatic quality.

There are also three modalities of the real:

The "symbolic real": the signifier reduced to a meaningless formula
The "real real": a horrific thing, that which conveys the sense of horror in horror films
The "imaginary real": an unfathomable something that permeates things as a trace of the sublime. This form of the real becomes perceptible in the film The Full Monty, for instance, in the fact that in disrobing the unemployed protagonists completely; in other words, through this extra gesture of "voluntary" degradation, something else, of the order of the sublime, becomes visible.

[edit]The Symbolic

Although the Symbolic is an essentially linguistic dimension, Lacan does not simply equate the symbolic with language, since the latter is involved also in the imaginary and the real. The symbolic dimension of language is that of the signifier, in which elements have no positive existence but are constituted by virtue of their mutual differences. It is the realm of radical alterity: the Other. The unconscious is the discourse of the Other and thus belongs to the symbolic order. It is also the realm of the Law that regulates desire in the Oedipus complex. The symbolic is both the "pleasure principle" that regulates the distance from das Ding, and the "death drive" which goes beyond the pleasure principle by means of repetition: "the death drive is only the mask of the symbolic order." This register is determinant of subjectivity; for Lacan the symbolic is characterized by the absence of any fixed relations between signifier and signified.

[edit]The Imaginary

The basis of the Imaginary order is the formation of the ego in the "mirror stage". Since the ego is formed by identifying with the counterpart or specular image, "identification" is an important aspect of the imaginary. The relationship whereby the ego is constituted by identification is a locus of "alienation", which is another feature of the imaginary, and is fundamentally narcissistic. The imaginary, a realm of surface appearances which are deceptive, is structured by the symbolic order. It also involves a linguistic dimension: whereas the signifier is the foundation of the symbolic, the "signified" and "signification" belong to the imaginary. Thus language has both symbolic and imaginary aspects. Based on the specular image, the imaginary is rooted in the subject's relationship to the body (the image of the body).

[edit]Postmodernism

Žižek's understanding of the postmodern can be characterized as an over-proximity of the Real. Žižek identifies various manifestations of this in postmodern culture, such as the technique of "filling in the gaps." (See Žižek's analysis). By way of "filling in the gaps" and "telling it all", what we retreat from is the void as such, which is ultimately none other than the void of subjectivity (the Lacanian "barred subject"). (See The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post-Theory.)

For Žižek, present society, or postmodernity, is based upon the demise in the authority of the big Other (see Jacques Lacan). Continuing the theorists of the contemporary risk society, who advocate the personal freedoms of choice or reflexivity, which have replaced this authority, Žižek argues that these theorists ignore the reflexivity at the heart of the subject. For Žižek, lacking the prohibitions of the big Other, in these conditions, the subject's inherent reflexivity manifests itself in attachments to forms of subjection, paranoia and narcissism. In order to ameliorate these pathologies, Žižek proposes the need for a political act or revolution—one that will alter the conditions of possibility of postmodernity (which he identifies as capitalism) and so give birth to a new type of Symbolic Order in which a new breed of subject can exist.

The Law. Žižek refers to the law throughout his work. The term "the law" signifies the principles upon which society is based, designating a mode of collective conduct based upon a set of prohibitions. However, for Žižek, the rule of the law conceals an inherent unruliness which is precisely the violence by which it established itself as law in the first place. (See For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor.)
The Demise of the big Other. One key aspect of the universalization of reflexivity is the resulting disintegration of the big Other, the communal network of social institutions, customs and laws. For Žižek, the big Other was always dead, in the sense that it never existed in the first place as a material thing. All it ever was (and is) is a purely symbolic order. It means that we all engage in a minimum of idealization, disavowing the brute fact of the Real in favor of another Symbolic world behind it. Žižek expresses this disavowal in terms of an "as if". In order to coexist with our neighbors we act "as if" they do not smell bad or look ridiculous. The big Other is then a kind of collective lie to which we all individually subscribe. (See Jacques Lacan on other/Other and Žižek's For They Know Not What They Do.)
The Return of the big Other. Paradoxically, then, Žižek argues that the typical postmodern subject is one who displays an outright cynicism towards official institutions, yet at the same time believes in the existence of conspiracies and an unseen Other pulling the strings. This apparently contradictory coupling of cynicism and belief is strictly correlative to the demise of the big Other. Its disappearance causes us to construct an Other of the Other in order to escape the unbearable freedom its loss encumbers us with. (See Looking Awry: an Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture.)

Žižek follows Louis Althusser in jettisoning the Marxist equation: "ideology equals false consciousness." Ideology, to all intents and purposes, is consciousness. Ideology does not "mask" the real—one cannot achieve true consciousness. This being the case, post-ideological postmodern "knowingness"—the cynicism and irony of postmodern cultural production—does not reveal the truth, the real, the hard kernel. Knowing that we are being "lied" to is hardly the stuff of revolution when ideology is not, and never has been, simply a matter of consciousness, of subject positions, but is the very stuff of everyday praxis itself. The cynics and ironists, not to mention the deconstructionists et al., may know that reality is an "ideological construction"—some have even read their Lacan andDerrida—but in their daily practice, caught up in an apparently unalterable world of exchange-values (capital), they do their part to sustain that construction in any case. As Marx would say, it is their very life process that is ideological, what they know, or what they think they know, being neither here nor there. The postmodern cultural artifact—the "critique," the "incredulity"—is itself merely a symptom/commodity fetish. Thus has capital commodified even the cynicism that purports to unmask its "reality," to "emancipate."

[edit]Politicization

Today, in the aftermath of the "end of ideology", Žižek is critical of the way political decisions are justified; the way, for example, reductions in social programs are sometimes presented as an apparently 'objective' necessity, though this is no longer a valid basis for political discourse. He sees the current "talk about greater citizen involvement" or "political goals circumscribed within the rubric of the cultural" as having little effectiveness as long as no substantial measures are devised for the long run. But measures such as the "limitation of the freedom of capital" and the "subordination of the manufacturing processes to a mechanism of social control"—these Žižek calls a "radical de-politicization of the economy" (A Plea for Intolerance).

So at present Slavoj Žižek is arguing for a politicization of the economy. For indeed the "tolerant" multicultural impulse, as the dogma of today's liberal society, suppresses the crucial question: How can we reintroduce into the current conditions of globalization the genuine space of the political? He also argues in favor of a "politicization of politics" as a counter balance to post-politics. In the area of political decision making in a democratic context he criticizes the two-party system that is dominant in some countries as a political form of a "post-political era", as a manifestation of a possibility of choice that in reality does not exist.

Politicization is thus for him present whenever "a particular demand begins to function as a representative of the impossible universal". Žižek sees class struggle not as localized objective determinations, as a social position vis-à-vis capital but rather as lying in a "radically subjective" position: the proletariat is the living, "embodied contradiction". Only through particularism in the political struggle can any universalism emerge. Fighting for workers interests often appears discredited today ("indeed in this domain the workers themselves only wish to implement their own interests, they fight only for themselves and not for the whole"). The problem is how to foster a politicizing politics in the age of post-politics. Particular demands, acting as a "metaphorical condensation", would thus aim at something that transcends those particular demands, a genuine reconstruction of the social framework. Žižek, following Jacques Ranciere, sees the real political conflict as being that between an ordered structure of society and those without a place in it, the "part that has no part" in anything but nonetheless causes the structure to falter, because it refers to—i.e. embodies—an "empty principle" of the "universal".

The very fact that a society is not easily divided into classes, that there is no "simple structural trait" for it, that for instance the "middle class" is also intensely fought over by a populism of the right, is a sign of this struggle. Otherwise "class antagonism would be completely symbolized" and no longer both impossible and real at the same time ("impossible/real"). His solution to capitalism is a rapid repoliticization of the economy.

[edit]Atheism

Žižek is an atheist. He has said he does not consider religion an enemy but rather one of the fields of struggle. He has also referred to himself as a "Christian materialist". Žižek believes theuniversalist aspect of Christianity should be secularized into militant egalitarianism, against the "pagan notion of destiny".^[20] This universalism he derives from the Christian death of God: God truly died on the cross and lives on as the "Holy Spirit", that is, in human community.^{[citation needed]}

In 2006, Žižek wrote an opinion piece published in the New York Times calling atheism a great legacy of Europe, and voiced his support for the propagation of atheism in the continent.^[21] He has written many pieces on the reinterpretation of the religious and the theological such as The Puppet and the Dwarf, On Belief and The Fragile Absolute.

[edit]Criticism

Slavoj Žižek's notoriety in academic circles has increased rapidly, especially since he began publishing widely in English. Many hundreds of academics have addressed aspects of Žižek's work in professional papers.^[22]

[edit]Argumentative method

Žižek's style is a matter of some debate:

Critiques include Harpham (2003)^[23] and O'Neill (2001).^[24] Both agree that Žižek flouts standards of reasoned argument. Harpham calls Žižek's style "a stream of nonconsecutive units arranged in arbitrary sequences that solicit a sporadic and discontinuous attention." O'Neill concurs: "a dizzying array of wildly entertaining and often quite maddening rhetorical strategies are deployed in order to beguile, browbeat, dumbfound, dazzle, confuse, mislead, overwhelm, and generally subdue the reader into acceptance."

While criticizing Žižek's style in general, David Bordwell criticizes his humor as an "academic humor" and in Bordwell's words academic humor is to humor what "military intelligence is to intelligence."^[25] Supporters such as R. Butler^[26] argue that such critiques miss the point and instead support Žižek's thinking: "As Žižek says, it is our very desire to look for mistakes and inconsistencies in the Other that testifies to the fact that we still transfer on to them...."^[27]

[edit]Social policy

John Holbo of the National University of Singapore has criticized Žižek^[28] for his alleged refusal to lay out what social formation he would replace the existing order with. Holbo argues that Žižek's "irrational" approach to thought disregards the ontic benefits brought about by late capital, specifically in its liberal-democratic form. A similar criticism, from a scholar akin to Žižek, is made byErnesto Laclau in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. In his "Response to Žižek", Laclau claims that Žižek's political thought is dogmatically Marxist, and often out of keeping with his psychoanalytic theories. Noting that "all of Žižek's Marxist concepts come from either Marx himself or from the Russian Revolution", Laclau asserts that "Žižek uses class as a sort of deus ex machina to play the role of the good guy against the multicultural devils. Laclau concludes that Žižek's political thought suffers from "'combined and uneven development'" and that "while his Lacanian tools, combined with his insight have allowed him to make considerable progress in the understanding of ideological processes in contemporary societies, his strictly political thought... remains fixed in traditional categories".^[29]

[edit]Alleged misreading of Lacan and Hegel

Some of Žižek's critics have accused him of misreading other philosophers and theorists, particularly Jacques Lacan and G. W. F. Hegel.

Ian Parker, a Lacanian psychoanalyst, complains that Žižek "delights in the most extreme formulations of what the end of psychoanalysis might entail" (Ian Parker, Slavoj Žižek: A Critical Introduction, Pluto Press: London and Sterling, 2004; p. 78). For Parker, this is particularly difficult when Žižek attempts to carry over concepts from Lacan's teachings into the sphere of political and social theory. Parker notes that Lacan's seminars were originally addressed to an audience of psychoanalysts for use in their clinical practice rather than for philosophers such as Žižek to produce new theories of political action. This is particularly true, claims Parker, of Žižek's appropriation of Lacan's discussion of Antigone in his 1959-1960 seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. In this seminar, Lacan uses Antigone to defend the claim that "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire" (Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment, Verso: London, 1994; p. 69). However, as Parker notes, Antigone's act (burying her dead brother in the knowledge that she will be buried alive) was never intended to effect a revolutionary change in the political status quo; yet, despite this, Žižek frequently cites Antigone as a paradigm of ethico-political action. Parker concludes that carrying over concepts from Lacanian psychoanalysis "into other spheres requires something a little less hasty and less dramatic than what we find in Žižek" (Parker, p. 80).

Noah Horwitz's essay "Contra the Slovenians: Returning to Lacan and away from Hegel" (Philosophy Today, Spring 2005, pp. 24–32) is a critique of Žižek's reading of Hegel. Horwitz claims that Žižek mistakenly conflates Lacan's unconscious with Hegel's unconscious. Horwitz notes that "the 'it' one is meant to identify with in [Lacanian] psychoanalysis is not some inert, substance irreducible to one, but rather the radically other scene where thinking occurs" (Horwitz, p. 30). According to Horwitz, the Lacanian unconscious and the Hegelian unconscious are two totally different mechanisms. If we take speech, Lacan's unconscious reveals itself to us in the slip-of-the-tongue or parapraxis we are therefore alienated from language through the revelation of our desire (even if that desire originated with the Other, as Lacan claims, it remains peculiar to us). In Hegel's unconscious, however, we are alienated from language whenever we attempt to articulate a particular and end up articulating a universal (so if I say 'the dog is with me', although I am trying to say something about this particular dog at this particular time, I actually produce the universal category 'dog').

[edit]Accusations of fascism and antisemitism

In In Defense of Lost Causes and Violence, Adam Kirsch has leveled the accusation that the politics advocated by Žižek, "that glorifies risk, decision, and will; that yearns for the hero, the master, and the leader; that prefers death and the infinite to democracy and the pragmatic; that finds the only true freedom in the terror of violence", is fascism, and that Žižek thereby "has inarguably revealed himself as some sort of fascist".^[30]

The accusation of antisemitism is less direct: "Under the cover of comedy and hyperbole, in between allusions to movies and video games, [Žižek] is engaged in the rehabilitation of many of the most evil ideas of the last century. He is trying to undo the achievement of all the postwar thinkers who taught us to regard totalitarianism, revolutionary terror, utopian violence, and anti-Semitism as inadmissible in serious political discourse."^[30]

In response, Žižek argued that Kirsch's critique is based on "many unfortunate misreadings".^[31] This includes strategically incomplete readings of Žižek's remarks concerning what's interesting or even admirable in the way Hitler mobilized Germany. Žižek writes that "Mr. Kirsch quotes my passage 'crazy, tasteless even, as it may sound, the problem with Hitler was that he was not violent enough, that his violence was not "essential" enough'--but is this really a call for even more killing than Hitler afforded? Here is how my text goes on: 'Nazism was not radical enough, it did not dare to disturb the basic structure of the modern capitalist social space (which is why it had to invent and focus on destroying an external enemy, Jews). This is why one should oppose the fascination with Hitler according to which Hitler was, of course, a bad guy, responsible for the death of millions—but he definitely had balls, he pursued with iron will what he wanted. ... This point is not only ethically repulsive, but simply wrong: no, Hitler did not 'have the balls' to really change things; he did not really act, all his actions were fundamentally reactions, i.e., he acted so that nothing would really change, he stages a big spectacle of Revolution so that the capitalist order could survive.'

In this precise sense of violence, Gandhi was more violent than Hitler: Gandhi's movement effectively endeavored to interrupt the basic functioning of the British colonial state."^[31]

[edit]Iran

Hamid Dabashi has criticized Žižek's position on the 2009 Iranian election protests, saying "For people like Žižek, social upheavals in what they call the Third World are a matter of theoretical entertainment. It is an old tradition that goes back all the way to Sartre on Algeria and Cuba in the 1950s, down to Foucault on Iran in the 1970s. That does not bother me a bit. In fact, I find it quite entertaining -- watching grown up people make complete fools of themselves talking about something about which they have no blasted clue."^[32]

Žižek has argued: "The demonstrations show that Islam has a genuine liberating potential to find a 'good' Islam. One doesn't have to go back to the caliphs of the 10th century, we have it right here."^[33]

[edit]Award

He was listed on Top 100 Public Intellectuals Poll.^[34]

[edit]Bibliography

Main article: List of books, films and articles by Slavoj Žižek

[edit]Other works cited

Canning, P. "The Sublime Theorist of Slovenia: Peter Canning Interviews Slavoj Žižek" in Artforum, Issue 31, March 1993, pp. 84–9.

[edit]Critical introductions to Žižek

Christopher Hanlon, "Psychoanalysis and the Post-Political: An Interview with Slavoj Žižek." New Literary History 32 (Winter, 2001).
Tony Myers, Slavoj Žižek (London: Routledge, 2003).
Sarah Kay, Žižek: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).
Ian Parker, Slavoj Žižek: A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2004).
Matthew Sharpe, Slavoj Žižek, a little piece of the Real (London: Ashgate, 2004).
Rex Butler, "Slavoj Žižek: Live Theory" (London: Continuum, 2005).
Jodi Dean, Žižek's Politics (London: Routledge, 2006).
Adam Kotsko, Žižek and Theology (New York: T & T Clark, 2008).
Marcus Pound, Žižek: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Interventions) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008).
Adrian Johnston, Žižek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008).
Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2009).
Dominik Finkelde, Slavoj Žižek zwischen Lacan und Hegel. Politische Philosophie, Metapsychologie, Ethik (Wien: Turia + Kant, 2009).
Paul A. Taylor, Žižek And The Media (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).
Raoul Moati (ed.), Autour de S. Žižek, Psychanalyse, Marxisme, Idéalisme Allemand, Paris, PUF, "Actuel Marx", 2010

[edit]References

This article uses bare URLs or very simple external links in its references. Such references are threatened by link rot. Please use proper citations containing each referenced work's title, author, publisher, date, and source, so that the article remains verifiable in the future. Several templates are available for formatting. A tool may be available to help. (July 2010)

^ "Slavoj Zizek Faculty Page at European Graduate School(Biography, bibliography and video lectures)". European Graduate School. Retrieved 2010-09-23.
^ Revija Problemi (30 October 2007), Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis, Ljubljana, Slovenia Cultural Profiles Project
^ ^a ^b Democracy Now! television program online transcript, 11 March 2008.
^ ^a ^b "Slovenian Philosopher Slavoj Zizek on Capitalism, Healthcare, Latin American "Populism" and the "Farcical" Financial Crisis". Democracynow.org. Retrieved 2010-08-13.
^ Slovenski biografski leksikon (Ljubljana: SAZU, 1991), XV. edition
^ ^a ^b ^c "Tednik, številka 42, Slavoj Žižek". Mladina.Si. 2004-10-24. Retrieved 2010-08-13.
^ ^a ^b ^c Slovenska pomlad: Slavoj Žižek (Webpage run by the National Museum of Modern History in Ljubljana)
^ "Delavsko-punkerska univerza". Dpu.mirovni-institut.si. 1999-02-22. Retrieved 2010-08-13.
^ "Tednik, številka 04, Dr. Božidar Debenjak, filozof". Mladina.Si. 2009-02-06. Retrieved 2010-08-13.
^ ^a ^b Žižek's response to the article "Če sem v kaj resnično zaljubljena, sem v življenje (Sobotna priloga Dela, p. 37 (19.1. 2008)
^ "Chronology: Slavoj Žižek, His Life." From Lacan.com
^ , Slovenska Pomlad, 1998-10-28,http://www.slovenskapomlad.si/1?id=103
^ Odbor za varstvo človekovih pravic, Slovenska Pomlad, 1998-06-03
^ Butler, Rex and Scott Stephens. "Play Fuckin' Loud: Žižek Versus the Left." The Symptom, Online Journal for Lacan.com.
^ Glenn, Joshua. "The Examined Life: Enjoy Your Chinos!" Boston Globe. 6 July 2003. H2.
^ Toni Dugorepec (2008-11-22), Slavoj Žižek: predavanje (1.del), Primorska.info
^ "ACTING UP. - Britannica Online Encyclopedia". Britannica.com. Retrieved 2010-08-13.
^ SASA members
^ [1], accessed 21 October 2010
^ I am a Fighting Atheist: Interview with Slavoj Zizek, Bad Subjects, February 2002.
^ Zizek, Slavoj. Atheism is a legacy worth fighting for. New York Times. March 13, 2006.
^ Google Scholar search for Zizek
^ Harpham "Doing the Impossible: Slavoj Žižek and the End of Knowledge"
^ O'Neill "The Last Analysis of Slavoj Žižek"
^ David Bordwell's "Slavoj Žižek: Say Anything"
^ Butler "Slavoj Žižek: Live Theory"
^ Amazon.com: Slavoj Žižek: Live Theory: Books: Rex Butler
^ Holbo "Critical Discussion on Žižek and Trilling"
^ Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek "Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left". Verso. London, New York City 2000. pp. 202-206
^ ^a ^b Kirsch, Adam (December 3, 2008). "The Deadly Jester". The New Republic. Retrieved 2010-11-03.
^ ^a ^b Žižek, Slavoj (January 7, 2009). "Disputations: Who Are You Calling Anti-Semitic?". The New Republic. Retrieved 2009-10-28.
^ http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/956/op5.htm
^http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/4559/iran_on_the_brink/
^ "Intellectuals". Prospect magazine. 2009. Retrieved 11 July 2010.

[edit]

لمناسبة الخطاب التسطيحي لجرائم البرجوازية القومية بقيادة بشار أبو حافظ بن حافظ بعد ثورة شعبنا في سوريا

2011-03-30T22:52:00.003+02:00

لماذا علي أن أطارد نفسي من جديد

لأكتشف أن خطوة اولى كانت لي

ونصف خطوة كانت كخبطة على وضعية نصف خطوة آخر

هذا ليس بوهم.. لكنه واقع ٌ واهمٌ لي

أما لغيري فهو على الأرجح أنه غير واهم

لأنهم استطاعوا معرفتهُ

والاستلذاذ بنصّه المكتوب

رغماً عن شموخ رذائلي

رغماً عن ابتعادي المنزوع عن الياء الأرضيّة

فياءُ ابتعادي سارقةٌ لظلالها في وجه الشمس

لطالما استشعرت غباء وجه الشمس..

هي كمثل دابّة ٍ بين صخور تلةٍ في الشام

*لا تعرفُ الرجوع إلى البربريّة

وخسرت شمسٌ .. نهارَ الرجوع إلى البربرية

*Barbarism
والمقصود هنا .. بحسب المعنى الذي بيّنه وأورده لنا العلّامة فريدريك انغلز فيما كمّلهُ على بحوث مورغان مورغان في كتاب "أصل العائلة والملكية الخاصة والدولة"، الفصل الثامن "تكوّن الدولة عند الجرمان" طبعة عام 1884. والذي بدأنا بإعادة دراسته وتنتقيح طبعته من اللغات العربية والانغليزية والألمانية (لغة الكتاب الأصيلة) في "مشروع انغلز"، ولا تزال ورشاتنا مستمرة لكن بتعثر أتمنى أن يذهب قريباً كي نكمل المشروع، والمدونة الخاصة به قيد الإنشاء

engelsprojekt.blogspot.com

وللمصطلح .. جذور من فلسفة هيغل

2011-03-30T13:17:00.002+02:00

أكثر ما يشعرني بالقهر رؤية الأغبياء سعداء

Giachetti On United States Military Relations With Turkey

2010-10-31T07:01:00.002+02:00

استكمالاً للموضوع السابق في مقالنا حول النقاشات التي دارت حول العاب تركيا الإستراتيجية،

وتبياناً للحقيقة

نقدم هنا بحث بعنوان:

العلاقات العسكرية بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وتركيّا

للباحث ديفيد غياشيتي - 2008

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40517534/Giachetti-United-States-Military-Relations-With-Turkey

تحياتي

جازمان

Debates about Turkey's Strategic Games - نقاشات دارت حول ألعاب تركيا الاستراتيجية

2010-10-30T05:57:00.014+02:00

في السابع عشر من يونيو هذا العام، دارت نقاشات بيني (جازمان) وبين بعض الزملاء عقِب حدَث الهجوم على اسطول الحرية والسفن التركية في البحر الأبيض المتوسّط، والتي كانت في طريقها إلى قطاع غزة الذي يعتبر جزءاً من المناطق الفلسطينية الواقعة تحت الحكم الذاتي الإنتقالي بقيادة شخصيات فلسطينية منتَخَبة. وقد كانت صحيفة "ميلليت" التركية قد سرّبت في الخامس عشر من الشهر نفسه عن بعض ما جرى خلف الأبواب المغلقة وفي منتدى إسطنبول الاقتصادي عن تصريحاتٍ لوزير الخارجية التركي أحمد داود أوغلو وعد فيها بالصلاة في المسجد الأقصى قريبًا قائلاً: "ستكون القدس قريبًا عاصمةً لفلسطين، وسنؤدي الصلاة معًا في المسجد الأقصى"، تلا ذلك أيضاً ما أوضحهُ مسئول في وزارة الخارجية التركية قول داود أوغلو قائلا: "من المعروف أن أي تركيٍّ يمكنه الآن الصلاة في المسجد الأقصى، لكن عليه الحصول على تأشيرة دخول "إسرائيلية"، وما يقصده داود أوغلو هو إقامة دولةٍ فلسطينيةٍ عاصمتها "القدس الشرقية" بحيث يذهب إليها الزعماء العرب بحرية ويصلُّون في المسجد الأقصى دون تأشيرة دخول إسرائيلية".

قمت بتلخيص النقاش بتصرّف، من هنا بدأ النقاش: ـ

س: هذه جعجةً ، اوغلو كغيره من قادة الأنظمة العربية يتكلّم فقط.. لو كان يريد الفعل لترجم أقواله إلى أفعال تجاه اسرائيل

جازمان: هو يأتي ليبيع بعد أن باعوا والناس اشترت وشبعت، فهناك تحالف تركي أمريكي في الشرق الأوسط. قبل 3 أشهر بدأو بخطط في لبنان وسوريا ووالأردن و الضفة الغربية ومصر، المشاريع الشبابية يفدون إلى تركيا عبر السفارة الأمريكية بالتعاون مع سفارات لبنان والأردن ومنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية ... تهدف بالجذور لإعادة تحريك الوضع السياسي في الشرق الأوسط بملفّات الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وبطرق غير مباشرة عبر برامج الأمم المتحدة والبرامج الإنمائية والبحثية المختلفة .. التأثيرات تبدأ بأعلام عربية تركية، هذه الجهات كانت من خطط لإيجاد حالة مظاهرات ثاني يوم بعد أحداث اسطول فلوتيلا. الاعلام التركية الكبيرة كانت مطبوعة بأعداد هائلة في بيروت ودمشق ورام الله وغيرها، كل ذاك مُدَبّر لرفع أسهم تركيا في الشرق الأوسط، بين طوابير العامة والقيادات الحزبية والمجتمعية الجاهلة بالألعاب السياسية.كل ذلك يحدث بمباركة اسرائيل

س: تقصدان الشعب التركي مع فلسطين، واردوغان مع فلسطين بالعلن لكن ضدها بالسر؟ التركي الذي انتخب أردوغان يعتبر ان أردوغان يمثله بما يقوم به تجاه فلسطين. ما يزعجنني، هو عدم تقدير الموقف الذاتي والتحرك حسب معطياته...الرأي السلبي على تركيا مثلا لم يبدأ إلا مع ظهور المواقف الرسمية "الإيجابية" لهذا البلد

س: موقفنا الحالي يتطلب وقفة صامدة ووحدوية، لأكبر عدد من الداعمين -بكل أنواعهم- للقضية لكل ما نراه نحن -بكل أنواعنا- عدلا وحقا

جازمان: ليون تروتسكي يقول بأن الحق الوحيد في مجتمع يقوم على الاضطهاد هو حق العامل في العمل، فعندما تلعب هذه الدول في عذرية العرب، يجب أن تمسك حقّك في المشاركة السياسية والعمل وترفض كل التدخلات من قبل "الداعمين" الإمبرياليين، لأنها تدخّلات امبريالية ليست في محاولة استنهاض فكر وإرادة المواطن في دول تابعة لإرادة الـولايات المتحدة، فلو كانت محاولة استنهاض/ لماذا لم ينادي أردوغان الشعب اللبناني والشعب الفلسطيني وشعوب الشرق الأوسط عموماً، لماذا لم ينادايهم بالتحرك وفق ارادتهم ضد التابعين؟، أتظن بأن أردوغان يريد إرادة حرّة للمواطن المظلوم !؟ أم تبعية أخرى للمواطن المظلوم نحوه؟. يظن الكثير من المفكّرين العرب ان التحرّك الإعلامي الأردوغاني والنجادي يؤثر على الإرادة الحرّة للعامل والمضطهد والطالب المهمّش الواعي والبرجوازي الصغير الواعي

أما بخصوص التكتيك والاستراتيجية، من قال بان الحكومة تقوم بالتكتيك لوحدها، وان الـ3 مواطنين لا يصنعونَ تكتيكاً ؟!؟

قس ما حدث في 1917 في بتروغراد حيث رفع البلاشفة في الجيش الأحمر علم كومونة باريس وهتفو باسم كومونة باريس، ولم يهتفوا باسم "بترو غراد" لماذا؟، لأن كومونة باريس هي التي تتجدد بديالكتيكها التاريخي في وعي متطوّر، فالمنطق الشكلي للصور التاريخية ليس مهمّا بقدر أهمية ودور المنطق الديالكتي في بناء الظرف الموضوعي في المعادلة الاستراتيجية في الشرق الأوسط، وكما يقول هيغل في فلسفته في التاريخ بخصوص التناقضات الماديّة التي يسري بينها قانون نفي النفي: إن كل تناقض مستقل استقلالاً تاماً عما حوله من التناقضات.

من القول السابق نستنتج أنه إذا كان العاملُ في دولة ما، والذي يقوم باستراتيجيّته المستقلة المنعكسة من وعيه الديالكتي، إذا ما حاولَ مناقِضٌ آخر أن ينفيهُ ويضرب وعيه - كما هي ألعاب تركيا الإستراتيجية- ليس تطوراً جدلياً ثورياً بأن يقبل العامل ذو الوعي المادي الجدلي بأن يسلبه ذلك المُناقِض ممارسته الواعية عبر أساليب القهر والهيمنة، ويبقى العامل سعيداً مستمتعاً باغترابه التاريخي في تفاعله اليائس ديالكتيكياً الفَرِح صُوَريّاً

س: يتحدث البعض هنا بنظرية المؤامرة، وبعد قليل يصبح هناك تعصب "عربي" ضد التمدد العثماني-التركي. إن هذا التوجه موجود في الوجه الاعلامي لدى دول الانحراف العربي وهو يقول بأن تركيا تضحك على الشعب العربي، ويهدف لأن تنتسى القضية الأساس ..القضية الفلسطينية

س: لقد نسي العرب منذ زمن، العرب خارج الصراع، اليوم اللاعب الاساسي في هذه المرحلة هو تركيا

س: حتى لو كان هندوسيّاً أو نرويجيّاً هو الذي يحمل لواء القضية الفلسطينية، أريد أن امشي وراءه.. من قال لك أن الشرط الاساسي أن يكون القائد عربياً ؟

جازمان

أولاً

أنت ترفض "نظرية المؤامرة" وأشك انك تعيها، لأنك استخدمت نفس الدليل في "نظرية المؤامرة" بقولك "التوجه موجود في الوجه الاعلامي لدى دول الانحراف العربي، وهو يقول بأن تركيا تضحك على الشعب العربي". نظرية المؤامرة الكل يهتف بها أو يهتف ضدها ويظن ان المؤامرة شيء مخفي فننبشه من الداخل، دون أن يعرف منهجية وأصول النظرية، ولم يقرأ الأسس الفكرية والفلسفية للنظرية في الفكر السياسي عند مفكّرين كبار مثل جان بودريار

ثانياً

تقول أنه حتى "لو كان هندوسيّاً أو نرويجيّاً هو الذي يحمل لواء القضية الفلسطينية، أريد أن امشي وراءه.. من قال لك أن الشرط الاساسي أن يكون القائد عربياً"،

ليس من الحكمة ولا من الوعي أن تقول ذلك ، فقد يعيّنوا لك جاسوساً ابن مناضل ماركسي، صديق مرشد أعلى، ويهتف لفلسطين والتحرير والكفاح المسلّح، وتاريخه ناصع إما بالقرآن أو بالعمل الشيوعي والشعب الجاهل بقياداته الجاهله يؤلّهونه ويتبعونه. إن كنتم أيها الرفاق والأصدقاء تظنّون أن هذا غريب.. أقرأو لـ"آرثر كويستلر" ما تيسّر من مذكرات في كتاب "الخمور الفكرية" أو "القومسيار" أو "ظلام في الظهيرة" لتدركوا خطر قبول النفي الهيغلي للموضوع التاريخي فيما يتعلق بالتدخلات والأحلاف الدولية

يجب أن نكون ضد التبعية للشعار، بل مع الوعي والإرادة الحرة للجماهير، لأن التبعية للقائد دون التحقيق في عذريته.. هو من نظام القبيلة، ونظام القبيلة ليس له جدلية مادية ثورية في الظاهرة/الحادثة التاريخية. انظروا إلى ما يفعلهُ أردوغان في كردستان

س: إن لتغيّر على صعيد السياسة التركية ليس لعبة، أنتم تقولون بأن لتركيا مصالح شخصية في تدخلاتها حول غزة، وهذه المطالب من بينها فكّ الحصار عن غزّة، أهل يُعقَل أن نقول للأتراك "لا نريد مساعدتكم". لقد دخل الأتراك في السياسة الشرق أوسطية لدعم القضية الفلسطينية وسقط منهم الشهداء والجرحى، فالشعب بأغلبه داعم للمقاومة الفلسطينية. لماذا نعاديه بدلاً من أن نستفيد منهُ ضد مصالح إسرائيل. أما "الأحرار الكردستانيين" الذين ذكرتهم هؤلاء يريدون تفكيك وحدة بلادنا وبناء وطنهم، وأنا لا أؤيّد هكذا حركات انفصاليّة، فتصبح أخطر من تركيا علينا ..

جازمان:
يبدو يا أخي في الله أنك لا تعرف تفاصيل بخصوص الإستراتيجية التركية الإسرائيلية الأمريكية تجاه شمال العراق والإقليم الكردستاني، لذا ينبغي التوضيح:

اضغط على الصورة لتحصل على حجم أكبر

أولاً: الخطط الإسرائيلية التركية في الشرق الأوسط، خصوصاً شمال العراق:

هناك خطة لا يمكن تجاهلها بين اسرائيل وتركيا لإقامة "منطقة أمنية" في شمال العراق، وهذه الخطة في صياغتها الأولى "منطقة عازلة" تشكل امتداداً لسياسة اسرائيل في التعامل مع جنوب لبنان "الحزام الأمني"، كما أن تركيا وافقت عليها في صياغتها الثانية المعدّلة باسم "منطقة خطورة مؤقتة-أنشطة استخبارية وأمنية" كي تستفيد من هذه المنطقة التعاونية مع اسرائيل في خبراتها الأمنية والتجسسية خاصة في مجال تفكيك الدول العربية في الشرق الأوسط، وفي مجال السعي لتجزئة المجزّأ وتقسيم المقسّم وفكفكة ما تبقّى.

وفي سياق هذا التعاون قامت حبيبتكم تركيّا بتوقيع اتفاق "التعاون في مجال مكافحة الإرهاب" مع إسرائيل بتاريخ تشرين ثاني/نوفمبر 1994. > ستر الله علينا وعلى القطّة بالذيل< ++ اتفاق "تعاون عسكري" أبرمتهُ حبيبتكم في شباط فبراير 1996. والسيد النبيل أردوغان مستمر في دعم المقاومة الفلسطينية عبر المايك
لا يخفى على أحد أن لإسرائيل ارتباطات عديدة بفصائل كردية وعراقية، وهذا ضمن إطار سياستها الداعمة للحركات الطائفية والانفصالية. ليس فقط كردية وعراقية، بل وأيضاً فلسطينية ولبنانية و....... إلخ.

ثانياً: الخطط التركية مع الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في شمال العراق

في 10/9/1996.. "كريستوفر بحث هاتفياً مع تشيللر خطة أنقرة لإقامة حزام أمني شمال العراق، وأنها أبلغته أن الإجراء التركي سيكون محدوداً ولن يتم بموجبه وضع أي قوات بصفة دائمة في شمال العراق، وعلى هذا الأساس أبدت واشنطن تأييدها لإقامة المنطقة العازلة في شمال العراق" _الأهرام، 11/9/1996،ص1_

وللعلم:
كريستوفر: وزير الخارجية الأمريكي.
تشيللر: " تانسو تشيللر " عميل سي آي إيه ورئيس وزارة تركية. حبّذا لو تقرأون تحليل لأوجلان هنا حول تشيللر واختراقات الـسي آي إيه للوزارات التركية والحكومة التركية
http://www.gemyakurda.net/modules.ph...rint&sid=25289

هذا ليس بعيداً عن المصالح النفطية، فالولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لم تكن لعنت أمن العراق تماماً بعد، فتأييد تركيا لواشنطن في اقتراحها، يدعم حصار العراق، من خلال سهر تركيا على منطقتي "الحظر الجوي" في الشمال و"المنطقة الأمنية التركية" في الجنوب .. التي تم توسيعها إلى أقرب مشارف ضواحي بغداد الجنوبية حفاظاً على المصالح النفطية في بلدان الخليج العربي.. وهنا، وفق هذا الاتصال الهاتفي، تعطي واشنطن الأوامر والضوء الأخضر لتركيا كي تتحرك عسكرياً لاحتلال جزء من شمال العراق بحجة إقامة "منطقة أمنية عازلة لمواجهة هجمات متمرديها الأكراد، وهو بذاته نفس موقفها المساند لإسرائيل في احتلالها جزءاً من جنوب لبنان باسم "الضرورات الأمنية". كل هذا أيضاً كي تحصل تركياً على أغذية ديمقراطية تمكّنها من الجلوس على كرسي الاتحاد الأوروبي. فصحّة إلى تركياً !. وصحّة إلى الشعب العربي الأصيل !.

تحيا سياسة السي أي إيه التركية لدعم المقاومة الفلسطينية عبر شاشات التلفاز!

والسؤال الذي يطرح نفسه، هل قام السيد أردوغان، العثماني المسلم، بإعادة التفاوض على هذه المواثيق العسكرية، بعد حرب غزة، ؟؟ أين؟

نحن لم نتحدث حتى الآن عن صفقات الأسلحة ووبرامج المناورات المسلحة المشتركة بين اسرائيل وتركيا والولايات المتحدة..

وزيادة على ما سبق، سأورد ما ذكره أحمد الخطواني في مدونته

حكومة أردوغان في المواقف الحاسمة تدعم (اسرائيل )
بالرغم من التهويش الاعلامي الذي تقوم به الحكومة التركية ضد (اسرائيل) إلاّ أنها في المواقف الحاسمة تقف إلى جانب (اسرائيل) فمثلاً نجحت (إسرائيل) في الانضمام إلى منظمة التعاون والتنمية الاقتصادية بعد أن وافقت جميع الأعضاء الثلاثين في المنظمة بما فيها تركيا على انضمام (إسرائيل) إليها.
ومن المعلوم بحسب قانون المنظمة أن بإمكان أي دولة عضو في المنظمة الحيلولة دون إدخال (إسرائيل) إليها بمجرد اعتراضها على منحها العضوية لأي سبب تراه يُؤثر على مصالحها، لكن أياً من الدول الأعضاء بما فيها تركيا لم تمارس حقها في الاعتراض ووافقت جميعها بالإجماع على قبولها فيها عضواً جديداً له كامل المزايا كسائر الأعضاء الآخرين.
ومن أهم مزايا العضوية في منظمة التعاون والتنمية الاقتصادية نقل الخبرة التكنولوجية في مجالات عديدة إلى أعضائها، ومنها أيضاً تسهيل دخول الاستثمارات الضخمة إلى الأعضاء الجدد.
لقد انضمت (إسرائيل) إلى هذه المنظمة التي تجمع الدول الصناعية المتقدمة في الوقت الذي تقف فيه دولاً صناعية كبرى على أبواب المنظمة منذ سنوات عاجزة عن دخولها كالصين وروسيا والبرازيل وجنوب أفريقيا.
وتتوقع (إسرائيل) بعد انضمامها للمنظمة جذب أكثر من خمسة مليارات دولار من الاستثمارات إليها في أقرب وقت ممكن فضلاً عن تلقيها معرفة تكنولوجية صناعية جديدة.
إن دخول (إسرائيل) إلى هذه المنظمة لا شك بأنه يُكسبها بالإضافة إلى الفوائد الاقتصادية الكبيرة فوائد سياسية جمة ليس أقلها منحها الحق في منع دخول أعضاء جدد إلى المنظمة، وهو ما يمنحها المزيد من الثقل السياسي الدولي.
لقد كانت الفرصة مواتية جداً لحكومة أردوغان في تركيا أن تُمارس حقها في منع (إسرائيل) من دخول هذه المنظمة المهمة، إلا أنها وللأسف الشديد ضيَّعت هذه الفرصة، ومكَّنت (إسرائيل) من الدخول إليها، وبالتالي من زيادة قوتها في المنطقة وفي العالم.
وادعت حكومة أردوغان بأنها إنما سمحت (لإسرائيل) بالدخول إلى المنظمة بسبب تعرض الحكومة التركية لضغوط أمريكية قوية لم تستطع مقاومتها.
فلو كانت حكومة أردوغان تملك قرارها بيدها لرفضت تلك الضغوط بكل إصرار، ولكنها بإذعانها للضغوط الأمريكية تُثبت مرة أخرى بأنها مجرد حكومة عميلة وتابعة لأمريكا، وأن كل ما يصدر عنها من جعجعات ضد (إسرائيل) هو مجرد شعارات جوفاء لا تؤثر في إضعاف قوة الدولة اليهودية، وأما المواقف الحقيقية المؤثرة لحكومة أردوغان والتي لها صلة (بإسرائيل) فهي دائماً تصب في مصلحة الدولة اليهودية .

Miguel De Caro

2010-10-28T12:40:00.001+02:00

This is Original and traditional tango with the fascinating mix of tradition and the sonorities, openness and freedom qualities of Jazz and World Music by Miguel De Caro on saxophone

Tango: Malena (Homero Manzi)
Miguel De Caro: tenor saxophone - saxofon tenor

CD's and DVD at: http://www.tangostore.com/officialsto...
web page: http://www.myspace.com/decarotango

Jazz & מהפכה

2010-08-14T22:33:00.002+03:00

Nina Simone - Revolution

"Hey, we’re in the middle of a revolution / because I see the face of things to come (yes I do) / Oh, your Constitution — / Well, my friend, its gonna have to bend…

I’m here to tell you about / destruction / of all the evil it will have to end…
It’s gonna be alright, / everything’s gonna be alright.
Well, some folks gonna get the notion / I know: they’ll say I’m preachin’ hate / Hey, but if I have to swim the ocean / well, I would, just to communicate — /
It’s not as simple / as talkin’ jive / the daily struggle just to stay alive…
I’m talking about a revolution / because I’m talkin’ about a change / more than just evolution / well you know, we all got clean our brain —
The only way that we can stand, in fact / Is when they get their foot off our back!"

مع ميم - قضية رقم 272

2010-07-27T01:48:00.001+03:00

يتم عرض هذه القضية استكمالاً لقضايا "مع ميم" السابقة، ويرجى الملاحظة أن "ميم" هي أنثى إفتراضية

قضية رقم 272

أسئلة القضية، ووصف الحالة:

لماذا لا تريدي محاولة التفكير؟، أن تفكري بالذات في شيء قلتهُ ولم تفهمي سببه؟، هل توتّري يجعلك تنفذيه كي لا نخسر ؟، لكن ماذا لو فكّرتي؟ هل هذا مجددا ً أمر (أو طلب) وبالتالي الطلب مرفوض تلقائياً من "ميم" وهي ليست تقبل أي سلطة، حتى لو كانت سلطة السؤال ذاته !.

لنعد مجدداً أيضاً، سلطة السؤال؟ فوبيا المواجهة لمجهول، يوجس أن يصنع تغييراً في فعل "ميم"؟، "ميم" تخاف الواقع الجديد!.. ،، آآآآه ..أذكر يوماً ما عندما عرضت عليها بعض التغيّرات على الساحة الدولية، رفضت وخافت من الواقع كثيراً، الواقع الجديد.. سلطة الجديد سلطة الواقع .. سلطة السؤال عن واقع جديد !.

خطورة الأزمة:

إن خطورة الأزمة تكمن في أن مواجهة السؤال وسلطة الواقع شبه معدومة، إن العنصر المدعو "ميم" متقوقع حول ذاته، في وضعية تكتيك السلحفاة عند مواجهة الخطر، وإن كان الخطر سقوط عن جبل، وتحطّم كلي.

الحل:

"الإسلام هو الحل !" p:

P JazzMan

White Sexual Slavery by US Occupation Forces and u.s security companiesالاتجار بعراقيات من أجل الجنس ـ

بيان : احتجاج وإدانة ضد عملية عسكرية تركية في إقليم كردستان العراق

بيان : احتجاج وإدانة ضد عملية عسكرية تركية في إقليم كردستان العراق

بيان : احتجاج وإدانة ضد عملية عسكرية تركية في إقليم كردستان العراق

Thomas Sankara توماس سانكارا

Lenin’s Choice: Interpretation vs. Formalization - Slavoj Zizek

ديفيد جيلمور-David Gilmour

Dear Comrade Zizek

Contents

[edit]Life

[edit]Thought

[edit]Ontology

[edit]The formation of the subject

[edit]The Real

[edit]The Symbolic

[edit]The Imaginary

[edit]Postmodernism

[edit]Politicization

[edit]Atheism

[edit]Criticism

[edit]Argumentative method

[edit]Social policy

[edit]Alleged misreading of Lacan and Hegel

[edit]Accusations of fascism and antisemitism

[edit]Iran

[edit]Award

[edit]Bibliography

[edit]Other works cited

[edit]Critical introductions to Žižek

[edit]References

[edit]

لمناسبة الخطاب التسطيحي لجرائم البرجوازية القومية بقيادة بشار أبو حافظ بن حافظ بعد ثورة شعبنا في سوريا

Giachetti On United States Military Relations With Turkey

Debates about Turkey's Strategic Games - نقاشات دارت حول ألعاب تركيا الاستراتيجية

Miguel De Caro

Jazz & מהפכה

مع ميم - قضية رقم 272